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Examining the Effect of Board Attributes on Firm Value of Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

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Abstract

This study investigates the impact of board attributes on the firm value of listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria over an eleven-year period (2012–2022). Out of the fourteen (14) DMBs listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) as of December 31, 2022, the study examined eleven (11) banks through purposive sampling. Data were obtained from audited annual reports, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used for analysis. Firm value was measured using Tobin's Q, while board attributes were represented by board size, board composition, and board meeting frequency. The regression results indicate that board size has a significant negative effect on Tobin's Q, board composition has an insignificant negative effect, and board meeting frequency has a positive but insignificant effect. The study concludes that none of the board attributes examined significantly enhance firm value. Therefore, it is recommended that corporate managers of listed DMBs in Nigeria optimize board size, ensure non-executive directors effectively fulfill their oversight roles, and make board meetings more strategic in achieving corporate goals.

Keywords: Board Attributes, Firm Value, Deposit Money Banks, Nigerian Exchange Group.

1. Introduction

Corporate governance represents a structured management framework designed to regulate and oversee corporate activities through the implementation of well-defined policies, procedures, and regulations that facilitate value creation (Aguilar & Soto Maciel, 2024). It functions as a mechanism that strengthens both internal and external control systems while ensuring the efficiency of information systems that protect stakeholders' investments and the financial assets of deposit money banks. Additionally, corporate governance fosters transparency, accountability, and the integrity of financial reporting by requiring companies to have their annual reports audited by independent and competent professionals (Ararat et al., 2017). It is fundamentally a system of structures and processes that guide and manage business operations, ultimately driving corporate growth and accountability (Mohamed et al., 2016).

Firm value embodies the goal of optimizing shareholder wealth while simultaneously safeguarding stakeholders' interests—an essential priority for corporate organizations. The long-term sustainability of a corporation is largely dependent on its capacity to create significant value for its stakeholders. Consequently, achieving wealth maximization through value creation necessitates the strategic application of corporate governance mechanisms. These mechanisms are fundamental in enhancing a firm's economic value, highlighting

their role as key determinants of corporate performance (Rifta et al., 2021). Among these governance mechanisms, board attributes play a vital role in strengthening firm value.

A firm's board serves as a central pillar of corporate governance, responsible for overseeing and advising top management to ensure the protection of shareholders' interests, thereby promoting effective governance (Baysinger et al., 1985; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). While scholarly perspectives vary regarding which board characteristics are most influential, commonly recognized attributes include board size, composition, frequency of meetings, as well as the educational background and professional experience of board members.

Despite the critical role of corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing firm value, the increasing prevalence of accounting scandals has highlighted the need for stronger accountability through the establishment of more effective governance structures. The relationship between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively debated, particularly in developed economies (Oladeji & Agbesanya, 2019). However, in recent years, greater attention has been directed toward understanding this relationship within the context of developing nations. At its core, corporate governance focuses on ensuring that financial capital providers receive adequate returns on their investments in corporations (Benvolio & Ironkwe, 2022).

Moreover, the global economic crisis and the collapse of major corporations in the past decade have raised significant concerns about the inefficiencies of corporate governance practices and the declining firm value observed in various capital markets (Buckby, Gallery, & Ma, 2015; Kakanda et al., 2016). The failure to implement effective governance frameworks severely limits investors' ability to evaluate banks and their financial performance, ultimately eroding confidence in the market (Abraham & Shrives, 2014).

In developing economies such as Nigeria, the low firm value of many companies has been linked to the absence of strong corporate governance, particularly in terms of board structure and oversight. The Nigerian capital market has been deeply affected by the global financial crisis, resulting in widespread job losses, diminished investor confidence, and growing doubts regarding the effectiveness of existing corporate governance policies (Ironkwe & Joseph, 2020). In light of these challenges, this study aims to investigate the influence of board attributes on firm value in listed deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria.

2. Literature review and hypotheses development

2.1 Theoretical Review

2.1.1 Agency Theory

Agency theory is a fundamental concept in corporate governance that explores the interactions between shareholders (principals) and company managers (agents). Originally introduced by Alchian and Demsetz in 1972 and later refined by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the theory explains how shareholders entrust managers with the responsibility of running the company. However, because both parties seek to maximize their personal gains, managers may sometimes prioritize their own interests over those of shareholders, leading to potential conflicts (Eeldrink, 2014).

The relevance of agency theory lies in its ability to clarify how board directors influence corporate performance (Vo & Nguyen, 2014). As firms expand, shareholders gradually lose direct control over operational activities, necessitating the appointment of professional managers who possess specialized expertise (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). While this delegation of authority is essential for

business efficiency, it can also create conflicting priorities, with managers potentially making decisions that serve their own interests rather than maximizing shareholder value (Davis et al., 1997).

The separation of ownership and management further enhances executives' autonomy, sometimes leading to strategic choices that do not align with shareholder expectations (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In response to this challenge, the board of directors acts as a regulatory body that ensures managerial decisions remain aligned with corporate objectives and shareholders' interests (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Muth & Donaldson, 1998).

From an agency theory standpoint, relying solely on managers to act in the best interests of shareholders without oversight can be problematic (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The board of directors plays a pivotal role in mitigating agency costs by ensuring adherence to corporate goals, reinforcing accountability, and directing managerial efforts toward enhancing firm performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Given this perspective, agency theory provides a strong foundation for this study, as it suggests that effective board attributes contribute significantly to firm value.

2.2 Board Attribute and Firm Value

Board attributes encompass the distinctive characteristics that define a company's board of directors. These features include board size, composition, independence, meeting frequency, expertise, gender diversity, ownership structure, and multiple directorships. A well-functioning board is composed of individuals who collectively contribute their skills and expertise, creating a valuable pool of social capital that enhances the firm's governance structure (Westphal, 1999).

Understanding the specific board attributes that drive effectiveness is essential in distinguishing high-performing boards from less effective ones. In this regard, this study seeks to examine and evaluate the key board characteristics that influence the governance and performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.

2.2.1 Board Size and Firm Value

The size of a company's board continues to attract debate in corporate governance research. Critics maintain that larger boards can suffer from coordination costs, free-riding and slower decisions, which may undermine board effectiveness. Supporters counter that bigger boards bring a wider range of expertise and more robust oversight that can improve firm value (Shaba & Yaaba, 2024; Wijaya & Memarista, 2024). Recent empirical evidence is mixed and appears highly context dependent. Cross-country panel evidence indicates a positive association between board size and firm performance (measured by ROE and Tobin's Q), although this effect is weaker in countries with stronger national governance frameworks (Omenihu & Nwafor, 2025). In addition, Megeid and Sobhy (2022) examined corporate governance, audit quality, and firm characteristics in relation to profitability, considering earnings quality as a moderating factor. Their study focused on 56 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2020, employing OLS and Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) regression techniques. Although their results indicated that board size had a positive influence on firm value, this effect was not statistically significant when measured using return on equity (ROE).

By contrast, studies from Sub-Saharan Africa find that increasing board expertise/diversity and, implicitly, increases in board size beyond a threshold may reduce financial performance for some firms, suggesting diminishing returns to larger boards in particular regional or firm-level contexts (Danso et al., 2024). Context-specific research in Nigeria likewise reports divergent

findings: some studies show that smaller, more independent boards are associated with higher firm value, while others find weakly positive or insignificant effects of board size depending on the performance metric and sample used (Bala et al., 2024; Shaba & Yaaba, 2024).

Overall, these divergent findings illustrate that the optimal board size varies across industries and economic contexts. While larger boards may strengthen governance through enhanced monitoring and advisory functions, smaller boards may facilitate efficiency and streamlined decision-making. Therefore, determining the ideal board size for maximizing firm value requires consideration of industry-specific dynamics, regulatory environments, and corporate structures.

Therefore, this study hypothesizes that; -

Board Size has a significant positive effect of on firm value

2.2.2 Board Composition and Firm Value

Board composition refers to the specific arrangement of directors within an organization, reflecting the diverse skills, experiences, and backgrounds that each member brings to the table. The makeup of a board is tailored to the specific objectives and industry demands of the organization (Palmer, 2022). A central component of board composition is the ratio of executive directors to non-executive directors. It is often posited that firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors tend to experience better firm performance and enhanced value.

For example, Benvolio and Ironkwe (2022) analyzed the effect of corporate governance on the firm value of listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. Using data derived from the annual reports of selected banks from 2011 to 2021, the study applied descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and panel data regression techniques. The results indicated a strong positive relationship between board composition and firm value in these banks.

Similarly, Laith (2017) explored the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of firms. The study, which analyzed data from non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange over a six-year period (2011–2016), used multiple regression analysis to assess the role of board composition. The findings confirmed that a well-structured board composition significantly contributes to improved firm performance. Additional studies, including those by Musa et al. (2019) and Oladeji and Agbesanya, also support the conclusion that board composition is positively correlated with firm value.

However, some research presents a different perspective. Abdulazeez et al. (2016) examined the relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance of listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria from 2006 to 2012. Their study, which used financial statement data from all 15 listed banks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), found that while board composition had an effect, it was negative and statistically insignificant concerning bank performance.

Further, Fariha et al. (2021) investigated how board characteristics affect the performance of publicly listed commercial banks in Bangladesh. The study, which included 30 banks listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) from 2011 to 2017, employed pooled OLS regression analysis. Their findings revealed that board independence, a key aspect of board composition, was negatively and significantly correlated with both Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q. Conversely, board independence had a positive and statistically significant effect on stock returns.

In summary, while the prevailing view suggests a positive relationship between board composition and firm value, some

studies indicate mixed or contradictory results, highlighting the complexity and contextual nature of this relationship. The influence of board composition on firm value can vary depending on the industry, market, and specific corporate governance practices in place.

Hence, this study hypothesizes that;

Board composition has a significant positive effect on firm value

2.2.3 Board Meeting and Firm Value

A board meeting represents an official gathering of a company's directors, where key corporate matters are deliberated, and strategic policies are developed (Kakanda et al., 2016). The frequency at which these meetings take place, commonly measured by the number of times the board convenes annually, is often viewed as a critical indicator of corporate governance effectiveness (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Chechet et al., 2013; De Silva & Hewage, 2022). These meetings play a vital role in an organization's success, as they provide a structured forum for decision-making, performance monitoring, and policy formulation.

From the standpoint of agency theory, conducting board meetings regularly strengthens corporate governance by aligning managerial decisions with the company's objectives, particularly in terms of value creation and financial growth. The theory suggests that frequent meetings enhance the board's ability to provide strategic guidance, enforce managerial accountability, and oversee operational activities, all of which contribute to improved firm performance (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999).

Empirical studies on the impact of board meeting frequency on firm value have yielded mixed results. Kanakriyah (2021) examined how board characteristics influence the performance of Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The study, which covered 85 industrial and service firms over a five-year period (2015–2019), applied multiple regression analysis and found that frequent board meetings significantly enhance firm performance.

Similarly, Arora and Sharma (2016) established a strong positive link between board meeting frequency and the performance of publicly traded Indian companies. Liang et al. (2013) also investigated the role of board characteristics in shaping the financial performance and asset quality of Chinese banks. Their findings indicate that a higher frequency of board meetings positively impacts bank performance, particularly in terms of Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). In the Nigerian context, Barisua et al. (2012) reported that increased board meeting frequency significantly improves the performance of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), especially concerning Earnings Per Share (EPS) and Net Profit Margin (NPM). Likewise, Al-Matari et al. (2014) identified a positive relationship between board meeting frequency and firm performance (ROA) for companies listed on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) in Oman.

Conversely, more recent empirical work produces a range of findings on the relationship between board meeting frequency and firm performance. Using a large panel of African banks, Kyei, Werner, and Opoku Appiah (2022) report that higher meeting frequency is associated with lower bank performance in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (though the effect differs across African subregions), echoing concerns that excessive meetings may be a reactive, inefficient response to poor performance. In contrast, evidence from South Africa is mixed: Mensah and Bein (2023) find that board meeting frequency positively relates to accounting and market performance for manufacturing firms in South Africa and Ghana (but not uniformly for Nigeria), indicating that more frequent meetings

can enhance oversight and firm value in some institutional settings. Other studies emphasise institutional and board-leadership differences. For instance, Hossain and Oon (2022), studying two-tier boards in Germany and Indonesia, show that meeting frequency's effect is context dependent (positive in Indonesia, but not in Germany), demonstrating that there is no universal effect and the board-meeting – performance link varies by country governance, industry, and board leadership.

Based on the foregoing findings from previous studies, this study hypothesizes that;

Board meeting has a significant positive effect on firm value.

3. Methodology

This study employed an ex-post facto research design to evaluate the impact of board attributes on the firm value of listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. This research approach was deemed appropriate as it involves analyzing historical data without researcher intervention. Additionally, the study seeks to determine how independent variables influence dependent variables, aligning with the nature of ex-post facto research, where variables are observed rather than manipulated (Simon & Goes, 2013).

The study covers an 11-year period, from 2012 to 2022. Out of the 14 DMBs listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) as of December 31, 2022, a sample of 11 banks was selected based on specific criteria. To be included, a bank must have been listed on the NGX throughout the study period (2012–2022) and possess complete and required financial data. Consequently, three banks that did not meet these conditions were excluded from the study.

Data for the research were obtained from the annual reports and financial statements of the selected DMBs. The collected data were then analyzed using the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique to assess the relationship between board attributes and firm value.

Furthermore, data for the study were collected from the annual report and account of the sampled DMBs. The data collected were analyzed using pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.

Variables of the study and their measurements

This study incorporates independent, dependent, and control variables. The study's independent variable is board attributes, represented by board size, board composition, and board meeting frequency. The dependent variable is firm value, measured using Tobin's Q, while the control variables include firm size, firm age, and firm leverage.

For the independent variables, board size refers to the total number of directors serving on a company's board (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013). Board composition is determined by the proportion of non-executive directors relative to the total number of board members (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Board meeting frequency is measured by the number of board meetings held within a fiscal year (Al-Ghamdi, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Vafeas, 1999).

For the dependent variable (Firm Value as proxied by Tobin's Q), it is measured through dividing the company's total assets by its total market value which can be calculated as:

$$\frac{\text{Aggregate Market value of firm}}{\text{Aggregate asset value of firm}}$$

Considering the control variables of the study, firm size is measured as the natural logarithms of total assets. (Harvey Pamburai *et al.*, 2015). Firm age is measured as number of years the company has been in operation from the date of incorporation. (Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010). while firm leverage is measured as

the ratio of total debts to total assets of a company (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015).

Statistical Model of the study

Following the immediate foregoing studies the statistical model of this study is presented as "

$TBQ_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BSZE_{it} + \beta_2 BCOM_{it} + \beta_3 BMET_{it} + \beta 4FSZEit + \beta 5FLEVit + \beta 6FAGEit + \varepsilon it$

Where:

TBQ = Tobin's Q
BSZE = Board Size
BCOM = Board Composition
BMET = Board Meeting
FSZE = Firm Size
FAGE = Firm Age
FLEV = Firm Leverage
i = individual Bank
t = Time (In Years)
β_0 = Constant (intercept) β_1, β_2, β_3; β_4: β_5; β_6 are regression coefficients or parameters; ε = Error term.

4. Results and Discussion

Descriptive Statistics

The Descriptive statistics of the data used in this study for TBQ, Board size, Board Com and Board meeting is presented in Table 1 thus,

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Skewness	Kurtosis
TBQ	121	0.4609	0.2384	0.06	0.96	0.2158	2.1771
BSZE	121	6.8099	2.5341	5	14	0.0448	2.7363
BCOM	121	0.6436	0.1226	0.35	0.9	0.1957	2.3212
BMET	121	5.4297	1.6873	3	11	1.0623	3.9938
FSZE	121	15.1472	1.5780	11.13	18.68	-0.2569	3.0152
FLEV	121	0.1330	0.1172	0.02	0.54	1.5740	4.9969
FAGE	121	40.2727	16.4057	13.00	77.00	0.4629	2.1411

Source: Author's Analysis (2024)

Note: TBQ= Tobins Q; BSZE= Board size; BCOM = Board composition; BMET= Board meeting; FSZE=Firm size; FLEV=Firm Leverage; FAGE=Firm Age.

The summary statistics outlined in Table 1 reveal that the average Tobin's Q (TBQ) for listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria stands at 0.4609. The lowest recorded TBQ value is 0.06, while the highest is 0.96, with a standard deviation of 0.2384. These figures suggest relatively minimal variation in firm value across the sampled DMBs.

Examining board attributes, the mean board size (BSZE) is 6.8099, with values ranging from 5 to 14 and a standard deviation of 2.534. Board composition (BCOM) records an average of 0.6436 (64%), with a minimum of 0.35 (35%) and a maximum of 0.90 (90%), while its standard deviation is 0.1226 (12.2%). The frequency of board meetings (BMET) averages approximately five meetings per year, with a minimum of three and a maximum of eleven, while the standard deviation is 1.68.

Regarding the control variables, firm size (FSZE) has a mean value of 15.147, ranging from 11.13 to 18.68, with a standard deviation of 1.5780. Firm leverage (FLEV) records an average of 0.1330, fluctuating between 0.02 and 0.54, with a standard deviation of 0.1172. Meanwhile, firm age (FAGE) has an average of 40.27 years, with a minimum of 13 years and a maximum of 77 years, and a standard deviation of 16.405.

To assess the normality of data distribution, skewness and kurtosis statistics were analyzed. According to West et al. (1995), skewness values should remain below 2, and kurtosis

should not exceed 7. The results confirm that the dataset satisfies these conditions, with skewness values ranging from -0.0254 to 1.5740 and kurtosis values between 2.14 and 4.99, indicating that the data follows a normal distribution.

Correlation Analysis

Correlation analysis is a statistical method used for measuring the strength association between two variables (Pallant, 2005). To explore the interplay among the study variables, this research employed Pearson correlation analysis, providing insights into the extent and nature of their association, as detailed in Table 2.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix

	Variables	1	2	3	4
1	TBQ	1.0000			
2	BSZE	-0.2029*	1.0000		
3	BCOM	0.0440 00	-0.1009	1.0000	
4	BMET	0.1047	0.0251	0.0351	1.0000
5	FSZE	0.2132*	-0.2520	0.1294	0.0072
6	FLEV	-0.2336*	-0.0081	-0.1444	0.0118
7	FAGE	0.3602*	-0.1541	0.0617	0.1773

Source: Author's Analysis (2024)

Note: TBQ= Tobins Q; BSZE= Board size; BCOM = Board composition; BMET= Board meeting; FSZE=Firm size; FLEV=Firm Leverage; FAGE=Firm Age.

The correlation matrix shows that Tobin's Q (TBQ) is significantly and negatively correlated with board size (BSZE; r = -0.2029, significant at the 10% level) and with financial leverage (FLEV; r = -0.2336, significant at the 10% level). TBQ is significantly and positively correlated with firm size (FSZE; r = 0.2132, significant at the 10% level) and firm age (FAGE; r = 0.3602, significant at the 10% level), whereas board composition (BCOM; r = 0.0440) and board meeting frequency (BMET; r = 0.1047) display small, non-significant associations with TBQ. Correlations among the governance variables themselves are generally low (e.g., BSZE–BCOM r = −0.1009; BSZE–BMET r = 0.0251), indicating limited bivariate collinearity in the sample.

Result of Regression Analysis

This study employs the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique as the primary analytical tool. The decision to adopt this approach was based on the results of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, which produced a p-value of 0.127 ($p > 0.05$). This test is typically used to determine whether Random Effects (RE) or Pooled OLS regression is more suitable for a given dataset.

As outlined by Baltagi (2008), an insignificant p-value ($p > 0.05$) from the LM test indicates that the null hypothesis (H_0) cannot be rejected, suggesting that the random effects model is not appropriate for the dataset. Conversely, if the p-value is significant ($p < 0.05$), the null hypothesis is rejected, implying that the random effects model is a better fit than pooled OLS. Given that the p-value in this study was not significant, Pooled OLS regression was identified as the most suitable estimation technique.

To ensure the robustness of the regression analysis, diagnostic tests were conducted. Multicollinearity was assessed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance (1/VIF). According to Hair et al. (2014), multicollinearity is a concern if

the VIF value exceeds 10 or if the Tolerance value is greater than 1. The results, as outlined in Table 4, confirm that multicollinearity is not present among the independent variables.

Furthermore, the study checked for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test. The test yielded a p-value of 0.542, indicating that heteroskedasticity is not an issue, as the p-value is greater than 0.05 (Hair et al., 2014). This confirms that the variance of the error terms remains stable, ensuring the reliability of the regression estimates and the overall validity of the model.

The Pool OLS regression result for this study and the results of the Breusch-Pagan LM test, multicollinearity check, and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test are presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Result of Pooled OLS Regression for TBQ

Variable	**Beta Coef.**	**T**	**p>t**
Constant	1.0179	3.56	0.001
Independent:			
BSZE	-0.0156	-1.83	0.070*
BCOM	-0.1870	-1.22	0.227
BMET	0.0087	0.79	0.433
Control:			
FSZE	0.0031	0.24	0.811
FLEV	-0.2076	-1.16	0.250
FAGE	0.0040	3.44	0.001***
Observations		121	
No. of groups		11	
R^2		0.3982	
Adjusted R^2		0.3494	
F-stat		8.16	
Prob>chi2		0.0000	
hettest		0.542	
LM Test		0.127	

Source: Author's Analysis (2024)

Note: * and ***= Significant at 10% and 1% Statistical level. TBQ= Tobins Q; BSZE= Board size; BCOM = Board composition; BMET= Board meeting; FSZE=Firm size; FLEV=Firm Leverage; FAGE=Firm Age.

Table 4: Multicollinearity Test

	VIF	**1/VIF**
BSZE	1.41	0.71
BCOM	1.33	0.75
BMET	1.06	0.95
FSZE	1.32	0.76
FLEV	1.33	0.75
FAGE	1.11	0.90

The Pooled OLS regression results presented in Table 3 reveal an R-square (R^2) value of 0.3982, suggesting that the explanatory variables in the model

collectively account for 39.82% of the variations observed in the dependent variable (Tobin's Q). Additionally, the overall model is statistically significant ($F = 8.16$, $p < 0.01$), confirming its robustness and suitability for explaining firm value.

Examining the independent variables, the findings indicate that board size (BSZE) has a significant negative impact on Tobin's Q ($\beta = -0.0156$; $p < 0.10$) across all significance levels. This suggests that firm value (Tobin's Q) tends to decline significantly among listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria as the number of board members increases. Consequently, this result contradicts Hypothesis 1, which posited a positive relationship between board size and firm value. The finding aligns with the research of Yameen et al. (2019) and Danso et al. (2024) but contrasts with the conclusions of Olajide and Agbesanya (2019) and Shaba & Yaaba (2024).

Furthermore, the regression results indicate that board composition (BCOM) has an insignificant negative effect on Tobin's Q ($\beta = -0.1870$; $p > 0.10$) at all significance levels. This implies that changes in board composition do not meaningfully influence firm value. As a result, Hypothesis 2, which suggested that board composition positively affects firm value, is not supported. Again, this finding is consistent with Yameen et al. (2019) but contradicts the findings of Olajide and Agbesanya (2019).

Regarding board meeting frequency (BMET), the results show that it has an insignificant positive impact on Tobin's Q ($\beta = 0.0087$; $p > 0.10$), indicating that an increase in board meetings does not significantly improve firm value among listed DMBs in Nigeria. Consequently, this result fails to support Hypothesis 3, which proposed that board meetings positively influence firm value. This finding aligns with Yameen et al. (2019) but contradicts the findings of Olajide and Agbesanya (2019).

Turning to the control variables, the regression results indicate that firm size has an insignificant positive effect on firm value, while firm leverage exhibits an insignificant negative effect on firm value. However, firm age emerges as the only control variable with a significant positive effect on Tobin's Q ($\beta = 0.0040$; $p < 0.01$), suggesting that older banks tend to have higher firm value. Meanwhile, firm leverage ($\beta = -0.02076$; $p > 0.10$) and firm size ($\beta = 0.0031$; $p > 0.10$) do not show statistically significant effects on firm value.

In summary, while board size negatively impacts firm value, board composition and board meeting frequency show no significant effects. Among the control variables, only firm age demonstrates a meaningful positive influence on firm value, reinforcing the notion that longevity in the banking sector contributes to corporate stability and value creation.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study investigated the impact of board attributes on the firm value of listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. The analysis was conducted using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique to evaluate the relationship between board characteristics and firm value. Based on the regression results, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. Board size exhibits a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the firm value of listed DMBs in Nigeria.
2. Board composition also has a negative yet insignificant impact on firm value, suggesting that changes in the structure of the board do not significantly influence firm performance.
3. The frequency of board meetings demonstrates a positive but

insignificant effect on firm value, indicating that an increase in meetings does not necessarily lead to a substantial improvement in firm performance.

In light of the study's findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are proposed to enhance the governance and performance of listed Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria: First, bank management should ensure that board size is optimized to enhance efficiency, as an excessively large board may negatively impact firm value. Proper utilization of board members' expertise and responsibilities is crucial in minimizing inefficiencies and improving corporate performance.

Second, corporate managers should strengthen the role of non-executive directors by ensuring they actively fulfill their governance responsibilities. Non-executive directors play a vital role in monitoring management and providing strategic oversight, which is essential for achieving organizational objectives.

Third, board meetings should be structured to focus strictly on business-related discussions and strategic decision-making. Effective board deliberations centered on value-driven objectives can contribute significantly to the improvement of firm performance.

While this study provides valuable insights into the relationship between board attributes and firm value in Nigeria's banking sector, it is not without limitations. One major constraint is its focus on only three board attributes—board size, board composition, and board meetings—while excluding other potentially influential factors. Additionally, firm value was measured solely using Tobin's Q, which, although widely used, may not fully capture a company's financial performance.

To enhance the robustness of future research, scholars should consider incorporating additional board characteristics such as board expertise, educational background, gender diversity, and ownership structure. Examining these attributes could provide a more comprehensive understanding of how board composition influences firm value.

Moreover, future studies should explore alternative firm valuation metrics, including return on equity (ROE) and the market-to-book value ratio, to offer a more nuanced assessment of corporate performance. Further research could also investigate the impact of risk management committee characteristics and audit committee attributes on firm value, thereby providing a more holistic perspective on corporate governance effectiveness.

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