



Democracy, Oversight and Legislature in Nigeria

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Abstract

There is a wide range of scholarly literature suggesting that oversight function has increasingly impacted on the democratization process in Nigeria. Accordingly, it was debated that oversight function had been severally misused and compromised by the legislature in Nigeria. However, despite many allegations against committees of oversight, it has been also argued that there are many instances where the executive has changed and responded to the recommendations of the legislature after conducting ex-post oversight, and that has proved useful to democracy. This paper studies how the oversight function of the legislature helps democracy in Nigeria from 1999-2015. The paper argues that the legislature in the Fourth Republic has increasingly used its oversight function not only in controlling the executive but it has contributed in the stabilization of politics, reduction of corruption and increasing the quality of democracy. The study engages in semi-structured face-to-face interviews with relevant informants. What follows, ultimately, is a qualitative analysis of data collected. The paper reveals that the function of oversight is improving in Nigeria. However, there are allegations of corruption against the legislature in performing that function. The study suggested that the legislature should be checkmated to reduce misconduct in some of their activities. Similarly, its recommendations and resolutions should be recognized and accepted by the executive to enable the democratization process.

Keywords: Democracy, Democratization, Governance, Legislature, Oversight

Introduction

There is an increasing number of evidence in the literature which suggests that the general functions of the legislature, and specifically, its oversight have an impact on the democratic process in Nigeria. Perhaps, oversight is the most important function of the legislature in democracy than the act of making law (Verney, 1962; NDI, 2000). This is more so, given that oversight function is a key determinant of government accountability, responsiveness, and transparency. Oversight function curtails the use of excess power by the president and other governmental agencies, and all these, in

turn, determine the quality of a democratic regime and its ability to survive.

Numerous write up both in academics and other literary outlets have shown that the Nigerian National Assembly (NASS) has been characterized by several conglomerations of activities in its oversight function. Furthermore, question has been raised regarding some activities of the legislature in oversight function (Fashagba, 2009; Hamalai, 2010; Hamalai, 2014, Staphenurst, Jacob & Olaore, 2016). It was often debated that the legislature is

overwhelmingly dominated by the executives and its oversight function had been severally misused and compromised (Lafenwa, 2009; Fashagba, 2009; Saliu & Mohammad, 2010; Punch, 2012; Nwagu, 2014). However, in spite of the allegations against the committees of oversight, it has also been argued that there are various instances where the executive has changed and responded to the oversight committees' recommendations after ex-post oversight and this has proved useful to democracy (Izah, 2013; Bolarinwa, 2015).

It is based on the above backdrop that it became imperative and pivotal to conduct a thorough investigation to determine how well or otherwise the legislature has performed in improving democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The examination of the legislature begins with its functions and its usefulness to democracy.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the role of the legislature in oversight and how it improves the quality of democracy in Nigeria. What is the role played by the legislature in performing its oversight? How does its oversight function improve democracy in Nigeria? This paper has critically engages in such questions and reveals that the oversight function of the legislature is actually improving democracy in Nigeria.

This paper is organized into three parts. The first part dwelt in literature in democracy, its meaning, processes of democratization and what makes it survive. It also introduces the concept of oversight and how it improves democracy and the role of the legislature in oversight. The second part is the methods of data collection and analysis used in the paper, it is an empirical investigation to understand whether oversight function is determining the quality of democracy and its survival in Nigeria. The study also presents the role of the Nigerian legislature in the larger part of

the Fourth Republic. Fourth Republic is a period of democratization from 1999 to date, and probably beyond. It is a longest democratic period in the history of Nigerian politics since independence (Egbefo, 2015). It is important development in the Nigerian history given that the First Republic spent only five years and three month, the Second Republic only lasted for four years and two months and the Third Republic was still rebirth.

The final part is devoted to the findings of the study, implications and recommendations for future research. The paper argues that the legislature in Nigeria is increasingly using its oversight function to hold the executive accountable to people and curtail their excesses. The study further demonstrated that from 1999-2015 the legislature through its oversight function has not only hold the executive accountable but oversight has also contributed in reducing corruption, stabilization of politics and increasing the quality of democracy in Nigeria. Accordingly, the paper unpacked the weaknesses of the legislature in using their oversight function, for instance, there are several allegations of corruption and misconducts against the legislature in the Fourth Republic.

The paper concludes that in Nigerian Fourth Republic oversight function is actually improving the quality of democracy. Moreover, the legislature should be checkmated in order to reduce misconducts. Similarly, it suggested that the recommendations and resolutions of the legislature should be recognized and accepted by the executive to enable the democratization process in Nigeria. The findings of this study will benefit scholars, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers to identify potential factors for enhancing democracy as well as having a better

understanding of the roles of the legislature in oversight function in Nigeria.

Democracy

Democracy is a concept accepted by many, it has several connotations attached to its meanings and definitions. Basically, the concept of democracy emerged from the two words of Greek, 'demos' meaning people and 'Kratos' meaning rule or power, which refers as rule of the people. Thus, democracy was believed to have its originality from the city-state of Anthen in the fifth century BC. It was probably in Anthen that democratic state begins and subsequently transferred to other cities.

In ancient Greece, democracy was applied and practiced and the whole population formed the legislature. It was much more feasible because at that particular time the population of the citizens hardly exceeded 10,000 and women have no right to politics.

In a city-state, citizens are eligible for the various executive as well as judicial functions either through selection, election or assignment by lots. In this system, all officials are engaged and responsible for the functions of the three arms of government and no separation of powers. Greek democracy was invariably a brief historical episode where modern democracy has drawn its inspiration (Bello, 2011). The concept of democracy has suffered from conceptual definition and interpretations. Several scholars have attempted to give it meaning based on their perception and understanding. For the purpose of this study, the conceptualization of democracy offered by Agarwal (2009) will be considered. Agarwal (2009) perceived democracy as the kind of government in which citizen is the source of the political powers, this means that an absolute state power is in the hands of people. This type of government allows people to take part in their governing process through their representatives. Moreover, he asserted

that democracy has to do with majority rule but the interest of minority is seriously considered. Looking at the definition of democracy offered by Agarwal it ultimately coincided with the concept of representation advocated by the proponents of representative democracy.

In another point, Bello (2011) views that democracy which most of its components in this period were emanated from ancient Greece refers to the system of government by the people of the people and for the people. He further considers democracy as an institution that really affects the lives of people across the globe, as it is practiced in both third and developed world. It is a political system that supplies constitutional mandate for most of the population to have influence in major decision making through choosing among several contestants for the political office (Adeosun, 2014).

The quest for democratization in Nigeria was started before its independence in 1960. It was spearheaded by several protests by anti-colonial social forces, and it has led to the formation of political parties (Sule, 2012). The struggle was successful in getting the independence as well as installing democratic government ushered in the First Republic 1960 (Sule, 2012). Politics has contributed to the social lives of Nigerians in the period of the first and second republic. The military intervention of 1966 bringing 30 years of military dictatorship has immensely affected the character of the development of the country. It led to changes in the character and structure of the Nigerian republic and lastly culminated in civil war. Despite the initiation of good programs, the military has captured the political lives of the country from 1966-1979 and subsequently from 1983-1999 respectively. The intervention of military into Nigerian politics has consequently reversed democracy in favor of foreign dependency, dictatorship, and unitarism (Sule, 2012).

Moreover, Mohammed (2012) has posited that the return to democratic governance in the Fourth Republic May 1999 was against the undemocratic practices that were antithetical to progress and development in Nigeria. However, despite the termination of military rule in 1999, the development of democracy is replete with lack of culture needed for the full participation and many factors have accounted for this, such as flawed electoral process, lack of national ideology, the crises of leadership and governance, the hardship of majority among others.

Democratic consolidation has become a serious challenge in Nigeria. Oluwale (2014) has observed that with the emergence of a multiparty system and the subsequent establishment of a democratic regime, there is greater hopes and expectations among Nigerians, however, after the conduct of three periodic elections the expectations have become dashed and faltered. There are several factors that make democracy to survive long, among other things it includes popular consensus, economic condition and institutionalized democratic procedures (Clarphm, 1993). Democracy survival has to do with consensus since it involves general agreement over political management including how to hold major offices on behalf of a citizen in the regime. Consensus also involves how to establish accountability of the political power holders. Moreover, the economic condition can foster a sense of identity and make accountability possible. Similarly, it can institutionalize democratic ideals as accepted and respected as a way of organizing the political system.

For years, scholars believed that what determine democratic consolidation was the duration of the regime. Accordingly, Huntington (1991) was looking at the duration of the regime, whether it had survived three electoral cycles or it had been, at least two

Pacific transfer of power or whether democracy had survived for at least twenty years.

Recent studies (Przeworski et al , 2000) have demonstrated that a democracy's capacity to stay long has nothing to do with its duration. Long established democracies could likely experience a democratic breakdown similar to the newly established democracies. More recently, Ahmed (2011) has considered the institution of parliament as important in making the survival of democratic regime and its consolidation. Studies indicated that what signal whether democratic regime is durable and consolidated is the capacity of the political system to ensure and maintain the belief that existing constitutional democratic institutions are more proper to the society (Lipset, 1959). Furthermore, the level of legitimacy enjoys by the democratic regime also determine its consolidation.

Oversight and Democracy

One of the reasons for increasing demand for legislative oversight in the democratic regime is a desire for executive accountability and good governance. This can be seen from the effort of domestic civil society organizations and other international institutions. The oversight function of the legislature is part of constitutional requirements of ensuring transparency, responsiveness and accountability in democratic governance (Hamalai, 2014). In a Presidential democracy, the legislature uses its oversight function to curtail the executives from the use of excessive power and dictatorship.

Accordingly, the legislature is an essential organ of any democratic government and a major element in its sustenance. In fact, its presence predates modern democracy. For instance, it has been noted that the beginning of the legislature dates back to the twelfth century and a product of medieval European

civilization transformed in the age of democracy to suit the necessities of contemporary political systems (Omotoso & Oladeji, 2019).

The Nigerian legislature is empowered constitutionally to perform its oversight responsibility to monitor, supervise and to hold executives accountable to the citizen. Oversight can be regarded as a method which the parliaments rendered executive accountable in its use of funds by detecting frauds and inefficiency, and ensuring that laws and policies are implemented in line with the intention (Khmelko & Andi, 2015). Many researchers have concurred that oversight responsibility if effectively conducted will help in consolidating democracy. For instance, Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2012) and Izah (2013) have shared a similar line of thinking, that the legislature alongside judiciary can perform a key role in democracy by properly conducting their oversight function. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012, 2013) have posited that the effectiveness of oversight goes hand in hand with the quality of democratic regime. Where the legislature is very effective overseers, the quality of democracy will be higher. On the other hand, where the legislature is less effective in their oversight the quality of democracy will be lower. However, in Nigeria, it has been seen that the level of autonomy, checks and balances and the separation powers are weak and therefore, the legislature is incapacitated in its oversight sometimes.

Nwagwu (2014) has studied the legislative oversight function in Nigeria and its effectiveness in guaranteeing good governance in a democratic system. The study found that this function has been misused several times; the legislature has been using the function for mere extortion of money in the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government.

Therefore, for a qualitative democracy, the legislature should be strengthened to effectively serve as a watchdog and not a hunting dog.

Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2012) have identified the features and nature of the parliamentary oversight of Ghana. According to them, there is a great improvement in the quality of democracy in Ghana, most especially after 2000 election. They observed that this improvement in the quality of democracy was facilitated because of the new constitutional design which has been made in 1992 to address the inadequacy of the constitution most especially in the area of oversight. The findings of their study confirmed that there is effectiveness in the performance of the committees of oversight in Ghana.

Benton and Russell, (2013), have assessed the impact of parliamentary oversight committees in the British House of Commons, they asserted that since 30 years back when the system was established, the functions of committees have considerably improved, particularly on oversight of governmental policies. The committees were given the power to hold a public hearings with top senior government appointees.

Oversight function in Nigeria has significantly improved from 1999-2014 and has led to several motions and resolutions that turned out to be good for people in the country (Hamalai, 2014).

Research Methods

This study employed a case study research design with the qualitative method of data collection and analysis. It used both primary and secondary sources of data. Interview method and reports were used as the primary source of data, while secondary source such as published articles and documents were used to support the findings. In-depth face to face interview has been conducted, it has been said that the interview method can be

utilized in exploring perception and understanding of the phenomenon (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Furthermore, the Purposive sampling strategy was used in selecting the informants because they are relevant in giving the required information (Creswell, 2012; Braun & Clarke, 2013).

Accordingly, eight informants were utilized in the interview and it was stopped when the saturation point was reached. It is maximum variation sample, where heterogeneous categories were utilized as informants; this will go a long way in enhancing the fitness, credibility, and transparency of data. The informants consist of two members from the NASS which form one Senator and one Member of House of Representatives from two different parties (APC and PDP). Two staff of National Institute of Legislative Studies (NILS) were similarly recruited and two staff from the Media and two members of Civil Society Organization (CSOs). The members of CSOs comprise one from Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) and the other from the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC).

The justification for using the informants is that they are the people that are directly or indirectly related to the area. Using purposive sampling based on the criteria to select them has provided reliable and accurate information.

Table 1: The codes and the category of Informants

Code	Interpretation	Frequency
NASS	Members of National Assembly (NASS)	2
NILS	Researchers from NILS institute	2
CSOs	Members CSOs	2
MDAs	Directors	2
Total		8

Table 2: Showing Numbering of Informants

Code	Informant Designation	No. of coded informant
NASS	Senator	1
	House of Representative	2
NILS	Research Fellow	1
	Research Fellow	2
CSOs	Executive Director	1
	Officer	2
MDAs	CISLAC	1
	Executive Director	2
	PLAC	
	Director	
Total		8

Discussion of Findings

This part focuses on the analysis and discussion of the findings of the paper. The legislative oversight in Nigeria has improved the quality of democracy by curtailing the dictatorship of the executive and stabilization of politics and exposing corruption. The analysis is in thematic form; several issues were dispassionately analyzed and discussed.

Oversight and Democracy in Nigeria

The desire for good governance and the increasing demand to strengthen democracy in many newly emerged democracies had made the oversight function of the legislature paramount and pivotal. Oversight is the constitutional responsibility of the legislature in ensuring accountability and transparency of the activities of the executives to the electorates. The legislature in Nigeria has three core functions of lawmaking, oversight, and representation. Among these functions,

perhaps, oversight is the most crucial. This is probably right as debated by Verney (1963) and NDI (2000).

In a presidential system where the principle of checks and balances is working with relative separation of powers, the legislature is saddled with obligations of lawmaking, oversight, and representation. In an interview conducted one of the informants leveled as NLS 1 asserted that *“the legislature in Nigeria has relatively performed their function of oversight as expected in a democracy, they held the executive accountable and forced them to realize the aims of government; they curtailed its excesses and ensure that dictatorship is avoided.”* The same has been reiterated by CSOs 2 and he added that *“the legislature has used its function in curtailing the executive from the use of excesses power, trying to unite the country and stabilize its politics.”*

In a report written by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2006, it was proclaimed that the legislature and the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Fourth Republic have been active in berating undemocratic culture despite long silence by the military dictators. The report has made mention of several instances where the CSOs and the legislature challenged undemocratic practices exhibited by the executive, an example can be found in the constitutional reform agenda of 2006 when President Olusegun Obasanjo tried to achieve his sinister agenda of extending his tenure from 2007 to 2011. The legislature has on 16th May 2006 rejected the bill which could have extended the tenure of Obasanjo (Dange, 2006; Omotola, 2006; Stapenhurst, Jacobs, & Olaore, 2016). During the interview, one of the informants declared that if not because of the oversight function of the legislature, the Nigerian democracy could have been

collapsed through political instability which may eventually lead to military intervention or civil war. Several scholarly works have confirmed that the reversal of tenure elongation or third term agenda was celebrated widely as a great victory to Nigerian democracy (Omotola, 2006; USAID, 2006; Egwu, 2014).

Since then, the legislature in Nigeria has reasserted its constitutional powers more and more than previously. For instance, it was observed that oversight function is frequently used during budgetary process (Awofeso, & Irabor, 2020). However, some studies have shown that in Nigeria often, the legislature usually confronted the executive only when there are issues of their interest and not that of national interest. Similarly, from other literature, it was observed that the legislatures and their functionaries in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, especially at the national level, have performed abysmally in discharging their oversight roles, resulting in a crisis of governance (Osunkoya & Basiru, 2019).

Yagboyaju (2011) has discussed the scenario where the legislature has acted seriously in violation of the President Umaru Musa Yar Adua when he was reluctant to release funds for implementation of constituency projects between 2009 and 2010. Similarly, the legislature has tried to impeach him because of his failure to release their constituency allowances. The threat of impeachment by the legislature proved the its power of checking the executive and the entrenchment of separation of powers theory or more specifically checks and balances.

Furthermore, some of the informants from NASS, CSOs, and MDAs have stated that the invocation of the doctrine of necessity in 2009 was one of the significant instances where the legislature has curtailed executive excesses and upheld democratization. What happened was the absence of the former President Umar Yar'adua from the country,

when he was admitted in a hospital at Saudi Arabia without proper delegation of duties to his deputy as needed by the constitution of the country. This had really created a political vacuum that had generated a controversy that would have undermined the political stability in the country if not because of the legislature's intervention. One of the most interesting aspects of Nigerian democratization was the role played by the legislature during that acceptable rumor that the country's politics will be collapsed. The legislature intervened and invoked the doctrine of necessity which had transferred power to Vice President to act pending on the return of the then president of Nigeria (Ema & Asadu, 2017; Yusuf, Yusoff & Zengini, 2018). By doing so, the legislature has rescued the Nigerian politics from the collapse and constitutional loophole. Here, the legislature has stabilized Nigerian politics and improved the quality of its democracy using its oversight function.

Moreover, Nigeria is considered as one of the most multi-religious and multi-ethnic country in the globe (Suberu, 2014). From the interview conducted, informants admitted that the legislature has taken various steps to unite the country, for instance, the legislature has repealed the Nigerian Pilgrim Act 1989 that has to do solely with Muslim Pilgrimage, by enacting National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) Act, 2006, and later initiating Christian Pilgrim Commission Act, 2007 (Suberu, 2014). This gives Nigeria a sense of identity as a multi-religious country where everybody is represented.

Accordingly, the National Assembly has also taken various steps to address the problem of Niger-Delta militancy, issues bothering good governance and stabilization of politics through unity and checkmating the dictatorship of the executive. For instance, during the debate and passing of Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC) bill, the

legislature has subjected the bill which started as an executive one to public scrutiny, it has overridden the power of the President and that had culminated in some important changes to the act. Research indicated that the legislature has overridden the power of the executive three times from 1999 to 2015. The instances are; in NDDC bill, 2000, Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) bill 2000 and ICPC amendment in 2003 (Fashagba, 2009). The principle of checks and balances has been applied in constitutional presidential democracy.

Regarding corruption, the National Assembly has done well about corruption by passing the bills of anti-graft agencies like Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC). However, the agencies have fallen below expectations in the reduction of corruption. The legislature as a watchdog of the government has the responsibility of finding lasting solutions to the problem of corruption. Accordingly, Muhammad (2013) has confirmed that the institutions like ICPC and EFCC have significantly contributed to reducing the menace of corruption to the minimal level.

From the interview conducted, NASS 1 affirmed that the legislature has conducted several investigations base on section 88 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This has been done through committees such as Standing committees, Appropriation committees, Ad hoc committees, and other various committees that are concern with information related to the administration of the state programs and implementation of policies. For instance, the committee on the public account has investigated the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) now Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)

all in 2001. The legislature has raised concern and pointed out some areas of controversies on the activities of these administrative bodies.

Oyewo (2007) and Fashagba (2009) have in separate works posits that legislative investigation has contributed in administrative rectitude responsibility. Notably, among such investigations of the legislature is the issue of controversy surrounding 2.3 Billion Naira of PHCN funds that could not be properly accounted. However, there had been serious allegations against the members of the committees of National Assembly for using their positions in obtaining contracts from these administrative bodies. Allegations of corruption and misdeed have formed some of the challenges of the oversight function of the legislature in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. Scholarly work has also shown that lack of political will, high turnover, and selfish interest have equally served as constraints to the legislative functions in Nigeria. More so, the resolutions and recommendations arising from oversight functions are not bindings on the executive.

However, despite all these allegations and challenges, Hamalai (2014) has posited that investigations have shown that the oversight function of the legislature has increasingly grown in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015. Though there are instances where the legislature has called executive for oversight and refused to responded, this, however, does not invalidate the relatively appreciable performance of the legislature in oversight function. Furthermore, the resolution of the legislature in Nigeria is not usually binding on the executive and therefore often refuses to implement it.

Another widely reported investigation was in 2001 when the house committee on aviation has exposed mishandle of 19 billion Naira propped as federal government intervention

to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the Aviation sector. Similarly, it uncovered unbudgeted inflated figures purchase of armored cars by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA). This scandal had eventually led to the removal of the minister (Hamalai, 2014; Abah, & Obiajulu, 2017.)

There is, therefore, an utmost need for both the legislature and the executive to relate closely to improve democracy and development. Separation of powers does not mean complete separation or watertight relation but the discharging of democratic functions by every organ of government without one encroaching to the function of other or using excessive powers.

The constitutional power of the legislature also takes part in budgetary and appropriation process. That had given it enough political power to shape governance, and invariably to carry reforms that may lead to national development. It is worth noting that budget implementation is the responsibility of the executives (Ogujiubu & Ehigiamusoe, 2014) while reviewing and monitoring of budget before, during and after implementation is the obligation of the legislature. A finding from this study shows that the legislature has made many efforts in ensuring compliance of the budget by the executive through impeachment threat or questioning the executive to provide reasons for the laxity in the implementation. However, in spite of the effort of the legislature capital expenditure implementation had never exceeded 54% of the actual estimates in every year from 1999-2015. Moreover, there are several allegations of corruption on the legislature during the budgetary process. Although, the legislature has been active in the budgetary process, they have introduced the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007 (FRA, 2007) and its Commission. In addition, FRA, 2007 has introduced a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

Conclusion

From the findings of the paper, the legislature in its oversight activities has promoted and improved Nigerian democracy by curtailing the dictatorship of the executives, checkmating their excessive use of powers, curbing corruption, stabilization of politics, scrutiny of budget and watching its implementation. Several motions and recommendations were raised because of oversight function that led to resolutions and laws.

However, the study showed that the legislature lacks the institutional framework of imposing some of their resolutions and recommendations arising from oversight activities. Moreover, some legislators were involved in corrupt practices in performing their oversight functions at the committee level and sometimes in the budgetary processes. The paper suggested that the legislature should be checkmated to minimize misconducts and misdeed. Accordingly, its recommendations and resolutions should be recognized and accepted by the executive to enable the democratization process.

Implications/Contributions

This research has contributed theoretically by studying the oversight function of the legislature using the principle of checks and balances in the Nigerian democracy. The principle of Checks and balances has emanated from the principle of separation of powers by Montesquieu (1748) and it has been the tradition of Presidential system of governance. The study has shown clearly that the legislature in its oversight function has checkmated the executive and curtailed their dictatorship; it exposes corruption and stabilizes the polity.

Methodologically, the study has provided empirical findings on the role of the legislature in the democratization process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. It utilized a semi-

structured interview, few reports and was supported it with a scholarly work and within a particular theoretical context. The data were obtained through a heterogeneous sample of informants, and this goes a long way in enhancing the data fitness, transparency as well as its credibility.

Moreover, the study has identified practical challenges of the legislature in Nigeria's Fourth Republic on its oversight function. It also contributed contextually in the Nigerian politics.

Recommendations for Future Studies

Future studies should consider focus group discussion in addition to one-on-one interview as another technique of generating data; this will strengthen the findings as triangulation of data source has been used. Moreover, the mixed method can also be applied since democracy and oversight function can be quantitatively analyzed. This can be done using exploratory sequential design, beginning with a qualitative method and then after the collection of quantitative data follows. In other words, the researcher can engage in exploring the phenomenon by identifying themes and then subsequently test the findings to discover the role of the legislature in oversight function.

Furthermore, there are various areas that are unexplored from the paper, based on that the future studies is suggested in the following areas; Nigerian National Assembly and the Constitutional Reform, Electoral Reforms, Democracy, and Legislature in Nigeria.

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