Impact of CEO specific characteristics on finance performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria

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Abstract
This study examines the impact of CEO characteristics on financial performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria. Data were extracted from the audited financial statements of the sampled firms for the period of Eight (8) years (2014-2020). The study uses correlation and ex-post facto research design. The population of the study consist of 16 listed DMBs in Nigeria. Census sampling technique is employed. The study adopts multiple regression techniques model in analysing the sample data with the aid STATA 13 version. The study found that CEO share ownership has a positive and significant impact on financial performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria. Moreover, the study concluded that CEO gender has positive and significantly impacted on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria. It is recommended that the board should introduce share based rewarding policy to all the managers/CEO in order to increase their shareholding which ultimately reduces conflicting interest that arises between the shareholders and managers/CEO. Thereby, the managers/CEOs become more efficient and in turn the financial performances of the banks increase. It is further recommended that the board of directors of listed DMB's in Nigeria should focus on employing the services of qualified and experience male as the CEO of the banks in order to improve the financial performance of the organization.

Keywords: CEO tenure, CEO Gender, CEO ownership, firm size and performance

1. Introduction

Financial performance of firms is one of the vital indicators used in accessing the well-being of every corporate entity in an ordinary business operation among investors, stakeholders etc. For instance, investors may wish to invest in a firm with a rated performance with the anticipation of good prospection (Mirza & Javed 2013). Therefore, firm's performance is the measurement of what has been attained by the firm, which serves an indicator of the good conditions for a period of time. According to Yahaya and Lamidi (2015) financial performance is used in measuring firm's overall financial health over a given period of time. Hence, the higher the firm performance the more it's successes, because the company is earning more money on less investment (Jenter, & Kanaan 2015). Therefore, this signifies that organisations must make a concerted effort to put together appropriate measures of chief executive office that might positively impact on financial performance.

The emergence of firm brought with it an attendant need for managing directors/chief executive officer (CEO) to ensure its smooth running as agents of the shareholders. Furthermore, board of management of a company appoint the CEO together top management staff to oversee the activities and ensure good performance of the firms, which are more consistent with the shareholders objectives shareholders (Yusuf & Abubakar, 2014).

Therefore, CEO's are charged some responsibilities by the corporate governance code of 2014 in Nigeria as evident by previous studies such as (Deitiana & Habibuw, 2015). It is also important to note that the CEOs have some significant role to play in organisation particularly in the banking industry in terms of attracting investment and ensuring confidence throughout the baking business and ultimately ensuring improvement in the banking performance, since the banks are financial institutions that are commercially oriented towards participate in providing financial services to customers.

The affiliation between the CEO's characteristic and financial performance, has been evident from previous studies such as (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Davidson et al., 2007; Jiraporn, et al 2008; Kim, Al-Shammari,& Lee 2009). have documented evidence signifying that executive characteristics proxied by executive's experience, power, age, quality, education and busyness affect organisational performance with mixed and divergent result. Therefore, there is need to conduct a similar study with aim to investigate the impact of CEO characteristics on financial performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria.

Over the years many companies have been suffering various forms of operational and financial management problems which have led to their collapse or wind up. Omondi and Muturi, (2013) as cited in Kokeno and Muturi (2016) state that the increasing trend of sudden corporate failure in both global and local context, shareholders and other stakeholders are increasingly becoming more concerned of the financial performance of their firms. However, despite impressive performance at the Kenya Securities Exchange, a number of problems relating to the way companies are controlled and directed by CEO ownership have been identified and this was revealed by the study of (Kokeno & Muturi, 2016). Also, Lasisi, Mustapha and Movis (2018) expressed that the recent collapse of the financial institutions in Nigeria emanated from global economic meltdown which was attributed the badly functioned subprime mortgage lending to firms and people by the top management officials such as CEO's. In that regards, there were persistent corporate merger and acquisition in the banking industry in Nigeria which has raised a serious suspicion and criticism among their existing and potential stake holders on the perceived financial mismanagement by the top management of the banks such as CEO's. In the same the banking industry has been experiencing series of operational and financial problems where some banks were merged or consolidate or acquired by other banks such as such Skye bank of Nigeria in a recent time has been taken over by Polaris as initiated by CBN (Popoola, 2018). This is no doubt; the merger and acquisition were seen to be emanated from poor operation and financial management by the top management of the organizations (Olasupo, 2018).

It is widely shared belief that the chief executive officer (CEO) is the most powerful financial member in the modern corporation (Fortune,1991; Eisenhardt, & Bourgeois, 1988). Therefore, the long history of controversies focused on how much impact CEOs characteristics have over the financial performance (Mackey, 2008; Quiley & Hambrick, 2014). In this regard, some scholars argued that chief executive characteristics substantially influence in the performance of their organisation (Rumelt, 2011). Contrarily, others have argued that chief executives are greatly constrained by financial inertia, path-dependence, rigid resource configurations, and pressures to adopt institutionalized norms such that, on average, executives do not hold much influence over what happens to their organisations (Havemen 1993). This controversy reveals the significance of studying the influence of the CEOs characteristics in the financial management. Meanwhile, prior studies such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Davidson et al (2007); Jiraporn, et al (2008); Kim, Al-Shammari, and Lee (2009); have documented evidence signifying that executive characteristics proxied by executive's experience, power, age, quality, education and busyness affect organisational performance with mixed and divergent result. Thus, the need for further study on impact of CEO characteristics on financial performance of deposit money banks (DMB's) in Nigeria in other to fill the existing vacuum.

In line with above background, the study seek to examine the impact of CEO characteristic on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria which will be anchored by financial performance measured by (ROA), and CEO tenure (CTEN), CEO gender (CGEN), CEO ownership (COWN) as independent variables, while firm size (FSZ) representing control variable respectively for the period between (2014-2020).

Objectives of the Study

The major aim of the study is to examine the impact of CEO characteristic on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria. Thus, the specific objectives include: Investigating the impact of CEO tenure on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria, ascertaining the impact of CEO gender on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria and examine the impact of CEO ownership on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria.

The researcher seeks to fill the existing gab and thereby serve as basis for financial decision and to also provide an opportunity for managers of the sampled DMB's in the study to adopt same strategy towards maximizing the value of the shareholders wealth in their organization. Accordingly, this study will serve as a basis for financial management policy making. And it will also serve as a reference for further research.

This paper is structured in to five sections that comprise of introduction, review of the related literatures, methodology, result discussion, discussion of findings as well the policy implications of the study.

2. Literature Review

CEO Tenure and Financial Performance

Some studies suggest a positive relationship, despite the fact that other results are suggesting negative relationships. This therefore, calls for further investigation to better understand the precise nature of relationship between CEO tenure and financial performance.

Miller and Shasie (2001) submitted that CEO tenure can have either positive or negative effects on organisational performance, depending on the CEO's life cycle seasons. In line with the Leader life cycle theory postulated by Hambrick, and Fukutomi (1991) there is an inverted curvilinear association between a CEO's tenure and financial performance. Five phases in a CEO's tenure have been recognized, this includes: 'response to mandate', 'experimentation', 'selection of an enduring theme', 'convergence', and 'dysfunction'. According to this theory, improvements in performance are obvious in the first phases of a CEO's tenure, due to openness, learning, and high task interest. Though, roughly after 6 years, performance declines as the commitment of the CEO to an archaic paradigm increases, and task interest along with information sources gradually declines (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). A number of empirical studies are inconsistent with this view (see; Henderson Miller & Hambrick, 2006, Giambatista, 2004; Miller D, 2001).

A differing perspective suggests that CEO tenure influences financial performance via two channels. The first channel stems from the organisation's relationship with its internal stakeholders, the employees. Longer CEO tenure will result in financial performance improvements, only if positive employee relations are achieved (Wang, He & 2009).

In addition, experienced CEOs are also able to apply their knowledge (March, 1991; Vera & Crossan, 2004) to fortify employee identifications with the organisation, which positively affects organisation performance (Skaggs & Youndt, 2004; Berger, 2006; Bolton, Bowman, Briggs; Kumar, 2014; Parasuraman & Terry, 2002; Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu & Kochhar, 2001). In this regard, the degree to which CEO tenure influence firm-employee relationships will partially determine the performance impact of CEO tenure. The second channel originates from the organisation's relationship with its external stakeholders, the customers. Ineffectiveness in satisfying the needs and wants of customers with the firm's product offerings will lead to failure in creating competitive advantages for the organisation (Day, 1981).

Furthermore, new CEOs appear to cater to the demands of the external stakeholders quite easily by leveraging diverse market, using customer-related information sources (Changanti & Sambharya, 1987), and developing new products with diverse qualities (Wu, Levitas & Priem, 2005). Acting in this manner contributes significantly to the reinforcement of organisation-customer relationships (Musteen, Barker & Baeten, 2006) which in turn improves organisation performance (Luo & Homburg, 2007).

Accordingly, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) posited that a number of studies argued that the relationship between tenure and performance is more complex than was originally thought. Short tenured CEOs, due to their lack of experience may not be able to effectively assess strategic risks. Therefore, their effort to spur top management team (TMT) risk taking will most probably not be satisfactory, even if they are willing to undertake strategic risks. On the other hand, long tenured CEOs, having a track record and accumulated knowledge of the firm's environment can acquire the resources and coalitions that are needed to facilitate risky initiatives. Therefore, they are more likely to be able to better manipulate the TMT strategic risk taking. A risk averse TMT usually behaves cautiously by over analysing the probability of a potential loss depending on the available alternatives. Conversely, a risk taking TMT is more prone to committing resources to such initiatives even before the possible outcomes are fully understood. (Zahra, 1996).

H_{01}: CEO tenure has no significant impact on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria.

CEO Gender and Financial Performance

Throughout history, males have predominantly occupied the largest firm's CEO (Chief Executive Officer) positions. More recently, females have breached this glass ceiling and increasingly take on CEO responsibilities. The relationship between gender and financial performance is a relatively new area of inquiry. Female directors sitting on the board have a higher expectation regarding their responsibility and role on the board which brings about better monitoring of the board. Pathan and Faff (2013) opined that excessive proportion of female sitting on the board could adversely affect the possibility of catching up with more capable male in the board. This influence is stronger within firms with low market power and smaller in size. More so, gender diversity signifies the presence of women sitting in the board and it leads to greater board diversity. Board gender is considered as an improvement to the financial value and performance as it provides new insights and perspectives (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003).

Matsa and Miller (2011) opined that the presence of women on the boards leads to the appointment of more women in senior management positions in the firm. By recruiting outside, the firm increases the chance of a female being hired as CEO given a certain percentage of women on the board. This therefore implies that a reasonable number of women in the board of directors will give the women opportunity to be hired as a CEO rather than appointing from outside the board. Corporate boards seeking cautious leadership would do well to consider female CEOs. Prior studies finding could be helpful in influencing public attitudes to be more accepting of female CEOs and more females in top management and boards of directors.

Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that firms with gender diversity in senior management are associated with higher earnings quality. They also found that, after the IPO process, firms with a higher number of women in senior management are more profitable and have higher stock returns than firms with fewer women in the management ranks. Also, Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003), based on Fortune 500 firms, found evidence that firms with a higher number of female executives have higher profitability relative to their average sector profitability, and (Welbourne, 1999), based on empirical findings, states that the results from long term study indicate that having women on the top management team results in high earnings and greater shareholders wealth.

Also, the studies of Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) and Carter et al (2003) both found a positive relationship between gender diversity and financial performance. Women tend to increase the oversight functions of the board. Moreover, women tend to differ in making investment decisions. Barber and Odean (2001) showed that men trade more excessively than women. They are more confident that their investment will result in profit, regardless of the level of knowledge they have on their investment opportunity. Moreover, men are more likely to pay out dividend than women. The risk aversion also differs. Women are more risk averse than men (Weber, Blias & Betz, 2012).

Ho_2: CEO gender has no significant impact on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria.

CEO Share Ownership and Financial Performance

CEOs share ownership is one of the numerous indicators that influence financial performance through its influence on the principal-agent relationships. Long, Mahanra and Ajagbe (2013) documented from their study on employee share option scheme and firm's performance. They argued that the ownership of a firm is a main governance structure that influences firm financial performance especially in Western Europe where over 50% of quoted companies have large stockholders who own more than 50% of such firms.

Shareholders are always regarded as the corporate owners, while directors are agents or representatives of shareholders who are supposed to allocate business resources in a way to increase their wealth. The motivation of many shareholders for investment in businesses is profit not control (Kadivar, 2006). Equity ownership structure as an important mechanism in corporate governance (Denis & McConnell, 2003), influence the quality of corporate governance and its ability to reduce agency costs (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). Therefore, testing the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance could help the investors to gain value by optimizing the firm's ownership structure.

According to Hand (1990) institutional investors are more sophisticated than other shareholders because they are more professional in terms of the capital markets operations, industries and businesses and they are better informed. In addition, institutional shareholders have higher capabilities in taking actions and can therefore monitor managers more effectively and less costly. Government ownership is argued to have helped in militating against business failure and bankruptcy. However, the social cost of monopoly power becomes significant where government ownership is assumed to restore the purchasing power of the citizens. Meanwhile, government ownership in industries which is of strategic importance for the nation (ex. natural resources, utilities and infrastructure) could also be argued to benefit the society as a whole (Grout & Stevens, 2003). CEO is committed to value rendering in company for promoting the activities of organisation (Sajjad, Mubashar, & Ahmad, 2015).

Ho3: CEO ownership has no significant impact on financial performance of DMB's in Nigeria.

In line with existing gap from the reviewed literature, the researcher anchored the study with Upper echelon theory and Agency theory in other to achieve the objective of the study.

3. Methodology

The study employed correlational and ex-post facto research design to enable the researcher examines the impact of CEO's characteristic on financial performance of listed DMB's in Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) between the periods of year 2014-2020. The study population constituted of 16 listed DMBs namely: United Bank for Africa Plc, Guarantee Trust Bank Plc, First Bank Nig Plc, Zenith Bank Nig Plc, Eco Bank of Nig Plc, Stambic IBTC, Sterling Bank Nig, Polaris Bank of Nig Plc, Fiderlity Bank Nig Plc, Diamond Bank Nig Plc, Access Bank Nig Plc, First City Monument Bank Nig Plc, Jaiz Bank Nig Plc, Wema Bank Nig Plc, Unity Bank of Nigeria Plc and Union Bank of Nig Plc. The study considered all listed DMBs that have existed between the year 2014 to 2020. A census sampling technique is employed as all the population is considered suitable for the study. The unbalance panel data were sourced from the annual audited finance statements of the banks as a secondary data. Ordinary least square robust regression model was adopted for the analysis through the use of STATA.

Model Specifications

In an effort to investigate the impact of CEO characteristic on financial performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria, the study adopted a model from Mailanyi, (2014) which encapsulates the contribution of CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO ownership and firm size respectively.

The panel model of the study is specified thus:

$$ROA_{it} = \beta 0_{it} + \beta 1CTEN_{it} + \beta 2CGEN_{it} + \beta 3COWN_{it} + \beta 4FSZ_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where:

ROA = performance of the periods

i=firms

t=times

$\beta 0$ = intercept

$\beta 1$-β 4 = coefficient of the explanatory variable

CTEN = CEO tenure of the period periods

CGEN = CEO gender of the periods

COWN = CEO ownership of the periods

FSZ= Firms size

ε= error term of the model

4. Results and Discussions

This comprise of analysis and test of hypotheses earlier formulated in the paper, descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix table, the summary of regression result, policy implication as well as recommendations based on the findings.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
ROA	-0.0244	0.4845	0.1011	0.0863
CTEN	0	7	0.8754	0.6991
CGEN	0	1	0.0804	0.2731
COWN	0	16.1312	1.9063	2.8351
FSZ	5.7098	9.6758	8.7623	0.8513

Source: STATA Output

Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistic for both dependent and independent variables of the study respectively. From the table, the observation of the study is 112. The DMB's in Nigeria are (16) as at 31st December, 2020. And the DMB's were studied for the period of 7 years. It can be seen that the average value of return on asset (ROA) stood at 0.1011 with minimum value of -0.0244 and maximum value of 0.4845. More so, CEO tenure (CTEN) has an average value of 0.8754. This value ranges from minimum of 0 to maximum of 7. This indicates that, the CEO tenure of listed DMB's in Nigerian stock exchange exceed a single tenure for some banks and some banks CEO spend only one year as the CEO. CEO gender (CGEN) in the listed DMB's can be seen at an average value of 0.0804, this value ranges from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 1which indicates that the variable is categorical in nature. This implies majority of the CEO are male. In addition, CEO share ownership has an average value which stood at 1.9063. The value ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 16.1312. The level of CEO share ownership which shows a minimum value of (0) implies that there are firms with no CEO share ownership. Thus, such banks' shares are owned by non-chief executive officer of the organization.

Firm size shows a minimum and maximum value of 5.7098 and 9.6758 respectively, the average mean value of board size is 8.7623 with a standard deviation of 0.8513 which is not far from the average value. Whereas CEO gender has the lowest standard deviation value of 0.2731 among the independent variables, this indicates it the highest contribution in determining performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria.

4.2 Correlation Matrix

Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix Table

Variables	1	2	3	4	5
`1. ROA	1				
2. CTEN	0.1213	1			
	0.2027				
3. CGEN	0.3209*	0.0521	1		
	0.0006	0.5856			
4. COWN	0.1639	0.0286	-0.127	1	
	0.0842	0.7647	0.1821		
5. FSZ	-0.1611	-0.1047	-0.0664	0.3429*	1
	0.0898	0.2721	0.4869	0.0002	

Note: ***indicates a very high significant level @1%, ** indicates a high significant level @5% and *indicates a significant level @10%

From table 4.2 that the pattern of the correlation among the independent and dependent variables indicates that none of the explanatory variables is approaching 0.8 or greater. This clearly indicates no suspicion of multicollinearity problem that may affect the outcome of the regression result. Though, this may not be enough to conclude that multicollinearity effect exists among the independent variables of the study until the variance inflation factor and the tolerance values are found not within the expected limit.

Also, the table reveals that there is a positive and insignificant relationship between CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO ownership structure and return on asset. This is indicated by a coefficient of correlation of 0.1213, 0.3209 and 0.1639 for CEO tenure, gender and ownership structure respectively. In addition to the control variables, the firm size has coefficient value of -0.1611 with a p-value of 0.0898 which is negative but significantly related with return on asset.

It is evident from table 4.2 that the association between dependent and independent variables were not too strong. More so, CEO ownership was negative and insignificantly associated with CEO gender. Also, firm size, is negatively related with CEO tenure and CEO ownership. This is indicated by coefficient of correlation of -0.1047 and -0.0664 respectively.

The relationship between the independent variables themselves was found to be insignificant exception of that of firm size with CEO ownership which is significantly related at 1%. Though, this may not be enough to conclude that multicollinearity effect exists among the independent variables of the study until the variance inflation factor and the tolerance values are found not within the expected limit. The VIF and the tolerance are two advance measures of assessing multicollinearity between the regressors. The VIF is consistently greater than 1 but less than 10. Accordingly, the tolerance value is consistently greater than zero but less than 1 which clearly indicates the absence of harmful multicollinearity as shown in table 4.3 below.

4.3 Multicollinearity Test

Table 4.3: Multicollinearity Result

Variables	VIF	Tolerance
COWN	1.16	0.85992
CGEN	1.03	0.96824
CTEN	1.01	0.987
FSZ	1.16	0.86228
R^2		0.1589
F-Stat.		**5.05**
F- Sig		**0.0009**
Hettest Chi 2		**0.0000**
Hausman Chi		**0.1249**
Breusch- Pagan		**0.0000**

Source: STATA output

From the Table 4.3 above, the result indicate that variance inflation factors were consistently less than Ten (10) which implies that there is no multicolinearity effect within the independent variables of the study. This clearly indicates the suitability or fitness of the model used in the study with one dependent and three independent variables as well as one control variable. Also, the tolerance values were consistently greater than 0 but less than 1.00. Therefore, this extends the fact that there is complete absence of multicolinearity between the independent variables (Tobachmel & Fidell, 1996). And the cumulative R2 (0.1589) which is the multiple coefficients of determination gives the proportion of the total variation in the ROA explained by the CTEN, CGEN and COWN jointly, revealed that about 16% of the total variation in profitability of the listed DMB's in Nigeria is influenced by CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO ownership and firms size respectively. Also, the F-statistics is 5.05. This indicates that the model of the study is fit and the independent variables are properly selected, combined and used. This is confirmed by the F. Stat which is significant at 1% level of significance. While, the evidence from the Breuch Pagan/ Cook- Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is 0.0000 which confirms the presence of effect of heteroskedasticity in the data. In addition, the Hausman specification test for fixed and random effect result reveals Chi- square probability of 0.1249 which implies that result was not significant. Thus, there is need to conduct further test to determine the appropriate model to be used. Finally, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects result reveals Chi-square probability of 0.0000 which implies that result is significant. Therefore, the suggested that random effect GLS robust should be selected as the best model but, due the presence of heteroscadasticity, robust ordinary least square was run and the result was interpreted as the best fit model in the study as shown below.

4.4 Random Effect GLS Regression Result

Table 4.4: Summary of Random Effect GLS Regression Result

Variable	Coefficient	Z- values	P-Values
Constant	0.2341867	2.72	0.007
CTEN	0.0164129	1.56	0.118
CGEN	0.1499008	2.03	0.042
COWN	0.0062614	2.92	0.004
FSZ	-0.0194621	-1.97	0.048

Source: STATA Output

Table 4.4, shows that the random effect GLS regression result has two significant variables which is CEO gender and CEO ownership one insignificant variable which is CEO tenure. Therefore, our interpretation is based on the random effect GLS regression result model; find attached the full result in appendix B.

CEO Tenure and Performance

The table 4.4 above, the CEO tenure has a coefficient value of 0.016 and p- value of 0.118 which is positive but insignificant impact on ROA. The finding is in line with the studies of Alexander, David, Musibau and Adunola (2015)) and Olaniyan (2010). The CEOs tenure are subject to regular renewal owing to the changes in banking operational policies based on the regulatory bodies requirement.

CEO Gender and Performance

From the table 4.4 above, the result shows a beta coefficient value of 0.150 with p-value of 0.042 which is positive and significant at 5%. This implies that the higher the male as the CEO in the bank, the higher it can generate profit to its shareholders at 15%. In other words, male CEO's are more aggressive when making financing and investment decisions and also more aggressive in marketing strategy to achieve the bank objective which is higher performance. This provides evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis which states that CEO gender has no significant impact on financial performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria, and concluded that the CEO gender is significantly and positively impacting on the return on asset of the study banks. The implication is that the higher the male as the CEO of the bank, the higher it can generate profit to its shareholders because high male gender led to drastic increase in profitability before tax to the banks. More so, the study is in line with the studies of Alexander et al, (2015) and Olaniyan (2010). On the other hand, the study contradicts the previous empirical studies such as:, Welbourne (1999), Kumar, Parasuraman and Terry (2002); Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003), Carter et al (2003); Skaggs and (2004); Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) and, Luo and Homburg (2007); Krishnan and Parsons (2008). Furthermore, the study also, supported upper echelons theory and agency theory respectively

CEO Ownership and Performance

The result reveals that CEO share ownership with coefficient of 0.0062614 and p- value of 0.004. It implies that every 1% increase in CEO share ownership will leads to an increase in return on assets of the

DMB's in Nigeria by 0.01k other variables constant. This indicates that the more shares owned by the CEO of these banks, the better the performance at 5% significant level. This further suggests that null hypothesis will be rejected which states that CEO share ownership has no significant impact on financial performance of listed firms on the Nigeria Stock Exchange and therefore, conclude that CEO share ownership has a positive and significant effect on asset on assets of the listed DMB's in Nigeria. The implication is that the more of CEO share ownership to the total shares of the bank, there would be slightly increase in the return on asset. Meanwhile, the more shares owned by the CEO, the higher the return on assets of DMB's in Nigeria. This is because when managers/CEO holds a significant fraction of a bank's shares, the interests of these CEO will become more aligned with those of outside shareholders.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper examines the impact of CEO characteristic and Performance of listed DMB's in Nigeria. It was discovered that CEO tenure is positive but not significantly influencing the return on assets of listed DMB's in Nigeria. However, the study reveals that CEO gender is positively and significantly impacting on the return on asset of listed DMB's in Nigeria. Furthermore, it was established that CEO share ownership had a positive and significant effect on return on asset (ROA). Therefore, it is recommended that the board of directors of listed DMB's in Nigeria should focus on employing the services of qualified and experience male as the CEO of the banks. The study further recommends that concentration of share ownership to the chief executive officers should be encouraged so as to maintain its positive impact on the performance of the listed DMBs in Nigeria

5.1 Suggestions for further studies

The study essential concentrated on three independent variables represented by CEOs tenure, CEOs gender and CEOs ownership respectively one dependent variable represented by return on assets. Another study may be conducted and considered other additional variables within and outside financial sector. This study is conducted within banking sector between the periods of year 2014 to 2020 in Nigeria. Hence, other studies may be conducted outside financial sectors with a different range of periods of time. The study considered secondary source of data suitable. But, another similar study may be conducted with primary source of data or different procedure. Also, this paper employed multiple regression techniques in analysing the data collected. Another study may be conducted with different techniques of analysis.

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