



The Dynamics and Challenges of Islamic Movement in Africa: A Study of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

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Abstract

In an effort to shed light on the motivations behind the policies, actions, and stances adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government, this study attempts to present an accurate and genuine understanding of the organization. The Muslim Brotherhood, its past as a social-political movement, and the organization's evolution over time have all been the subject of extensive inquiry. On the other hand, little is known about how the Muslim Brotherhood evolved following the July 2013 military takeover. Methodologically, Primary and secondary sources of data were used. Focus group discussions (FGD) and interviews were the main tools used to collect data for this study using descriptive survey research design. Findings reveals that neither Morsi nor the general public had any prior experience in governing, which would have allowed them to assess whether the movement could actually carry out its goals and make good on its promises. In a similar vein, not only were some of the demands made during the 2011 up rise in such as the enjoyment of equal social rights, civil freedoms, and an improvement in public life forgotten, but also the dominant political element, the exclusion and monopoly of the ruling Islamist faction, and the disregard for the cultural diversity of the Egyptian populace led to public disillusionment with the new leaders. This study comes to the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to adapt and survive the military takeover and subsequent persecution, with its international network playing a crucial part in this endeavor. The study recommends that Government must demonstrate responsibility, openness, responsiveness, equity, and justice at all levels, from the federal to the local.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Cultural Diversity, Islamic Movement, Muslim Brotherhood, Social rights.

1. Introduction

One of the most prominent Islamist groups worldwide and the oldest and biggest in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood. The reestablishment of the global Islamic caliphate is the primary goal of the Muslim Brotherhood (Friedland, 2015). "The Brotherhood is a social and political organization that wants an all-encompassing role for Islam in the lives of its members and in the broader society based on their interpretation of the Quran," as Friedland (2015) put it in his report. Based on Sharia law, the Muslim Brotherhood espouses a violent jihadist ideology. To that end, they have chosen a public, nonviolent approach to accomplish

their objectives. In the 1970s, the Brotherhood gave up violence and gained the public's sympathy by running hospitals, pharmacies, and educational facilities.

In response to what its leader saw as the degraded status of modern Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 (Friedland, 2015). The group has actively participated in a number of significant conflicts and revolutions, including the Egyptian revolution (2011) and the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). To achieve Islamic power, Muslim Brotherhood members have battled with larger alliances. With some 80 chapters across the globe, the Brotherhood has served as a major influence for other



Islamist groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda (Friedland, 2015, p. 4). The following are some of the objectives that the Muslim Brotherhood has declared: 1) Spread awareness of Islam and its teachings; 2) Unite the world under the banner of Islam; 3) Raise living standards and achieve social justice; 4) Fight against poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance; 5) Free the Ummah (Islamic Nation) from foreign rule; 6) Establish an Islamic state throughout the world; 7) Construct a new global civilization based on Sharia and Islam (By laws of the International Muslim Brotherhood, 2010, p.2).

The anti-Hosni Mubarak demonstrations began on January 25, 2011. Millions of Egyptians staged the so-called January 25 Revolution, demanding the removal of Hosni Mubarak, the country's current president. Marches, rallies, riots, square occupations, and strikes were among the forms of protest. On February 11, 2011, vice president Omar Suleiman declared that Hosni Mubarak had resigned as president and given the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces authority, following eighteen days of protests (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Egypt had its first presidential election in 2012, in which the country's head of state would be chosen directly by the electorate. The contest featured candidates from a variety of political backgrounds, and the result was truly unpredictable (The Carter Center, 2012, p.2). The 2012 presidential election took place on May 23–24, and the second-round runoff took place on June 16–17. With 51.7 percent of the vote, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi was declared the winner of the presidential election on June 24, 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood has achieved its pinnacle of political success with this win. The Muslim Brotherhood's rise to political power was viewed by observers as a litmus test for whether the group would stick to its core beliefs or shift toward moderation in response to the demands of governance. Widespread dissatisfaction with Mohamed

Morsi's economic mismanagement and inadequate administration characterized his style of leading the nation (Laub, 2014, para. 2).

As so, the Muslim Brotherhood's victory was fleeting. Millions of people protested against Mohamed Morsi, the president of Egypt, and demanded his resignation on the first anniversary of his presidency (Fayed & Saleh, 2013, para. 3). Soon after, on July 3, 2013, General el-Sisi, the head of the Egyptian army, staged a military coup that resulted in the removal of Mohamed Morsi, the country's first elected president. Additionally, the Egyptian constitution was put on hold. Furthermore, Adly Mansour, the Chief Justice of Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, was named Egypt's acting president by the Egyptian army, which also detained Mohamed Morsi and other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hauslohner & Booth, 2013). Following the military takeover, pro-Morsi demonstrators and security forces engaged in many altercations. In December 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was formally declared a terrorist group by the military government. El-Sisi took the oath of office as Egypt's next president on June 8, 2014. As soon as el-Sisi took office, he launched an oppressive assault against the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the Muslim Brotherhood was labeled a terrorist organization, it was prohibited from engaging in any political activity. The government also shut down a large number of the group's social-religious events. Numerous members of the Muslim Brotherhood moved to other nations, including Turkey, Qatar, and the United Kingdom, and began conducting business from these locations once the organization was the target of an oppressive campaign. The Muslim Brotherhood had to alter its organizational and doctrinal framework multiple times in order to withstand repression and demonstrate its opposition to the military takeover.



In order to provide readers with a clear understanding of the motivations behind the policies, actions, and viewpoints adopted by the Egyptian government as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, this study attempts to present a true and accurate assessment of the movement's current state. For this reason, it is necessary to review the history, the activities of this powerful group in Egypt over the past few decades, and the circumstances surrounding Mohamed Morsi's ascension to power. In an attempt to find the answer, every effort has been made to use the most recent and up-to-date publications, audiovisual resources, and insights from the top authorities. It is appropriate to state that this study used a descriptive-analytical methodology. The Muslim Brotherhood, a military organization, a coup, democracy, and civil liberties are examples of independent variables. The Muslim Brotherhood's inability to run Egypt's government is also regarded as a dependent variable.

Lastly, the majority of current research describes how radical Islamist movements can be deradicalized and provide alternative instruments or solutions based on lessons learned from participation in national initiatives. Other writers concentrate on the various causes of violent and social revolutions that occur within states, as well as Muslim uprisings against their governments. With the Muslim Brotherhood serving as a powerful example, it is still vital to examine the reasons for the Islamist movement's recurrent denial of radicalization and adherence to moderate development in order to accomplish its goals throughout the course of its history. This will give government's useful information to deal with similar organizations. The purpose of this study is to examine the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and determine how it managed to endure the July 2013 military takeover and the ongoing campaign of repression that it continues to face. The following are the precise goals:

What particular actions did the El-Sisi administration take to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood?

How did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt respond to el-Sisi's repression?

How did Muslim Brotherhood chapters around the world respond to Morsi's removal and the ensuing repression?

How did the friendly states of Qatar, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom respond to the Muslim Brotherhood following the persecution in Egypt?

2. Literature Review

Emergence of Muslim Brotherhood Movement

One of the most important Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood, had a significant impact on Egypt and some other Islamic governments. This organization was founded in the midst of Egypt's dire political, social, religious, and economic circumstances. Its dual goals were to extricate Islamic beliefs from their static and passive state and to attempt to govern Islamic fundamentals in social and political life (Enayat, 180). The Muslim Brotherhood's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was born in Cairo, Egypt, in the northwest corner of the city about 1900. After starting high school, he joined an Islamic association and started a new group called the Hesafiyeh Relief Association. Its two main goals were to defend Islamic principles from invasion by western missionaries and to promote and protect Islamic values.

The Muslim Brotherhood was later designed using this group as a model. He argued that the youth, academic and seminary students, and intellectuals held the key to the destiny of any nation and ideology, and as such, he concentrated his efforts primarily on these social strata. He was deeply concerned about the divide that existed between the younger generation and students from their local culture and Islamic realities. His intention was to focus more on



the oppressed classes while simultaneously advancing the objectives of the Islamic revolution, such as the formation of leftist revolutionary groups that raise revolutionary forces among the proletariat. He delivered lectures on Islamic theology at mosques, cultural institutions, and public gathering places. He also invited individuals who were impacted by his talks to private meetings, where they chose the organization's principal officers. Al-Banna claims that the idea for this organization came to him when he was studying Cairo and discovered that there was not even the slightest indication of Islamic law in the city. It appears that some pieces critical of Islam have been published in various magazines and press. He believed that mosques were insufficient for communicating Islamic ideas as he was aware of people's ignorance and lack of awareness about these principles (Farsi, 1986). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood Organization was founded with the support of Hassan Al-Banna and six of his colleagues who were highly intelligent. This group operated mostly in a semi-clandestine manner, disseminating information through a variety of publications, letters, lectures, and in-person encounters (Mohammad, 1995; Al-Huseini, 1996a; 1996b).

It is important to highlight that these booklets were warmly received in Egypt and other Arabic and Islamic countries. Many readers expressed interest in the Maghreb, Sudan, Palestine, and Jordan, and they stoked a passion for Islam in these countries. The Muslim Brotherhood's young and idealistic writers produced ardent and passionate literary works that at the time were unsurpassed in their excitement. Although the writers of these works were unknown to the public, their works were easily identified, and they were passed along from person to person. It is not unexpected that the Muslim Brotherhood's goals were accepted by all socioeconomic strata, and individuals from all walks of life

became ardent supporters of this movement. The Muslim Brotherhood could very well understand their goals for Muslims, it is a reality. To the best of their abilities, they used their journals, newspapers, and encouraging magazines to spread their word. Their work began mainly with a series of pieces they wrote for religious magazines. On March 5, 1946, they were able to print their special publication under the name "Muslim Brotherhood." Their journal was going to be transformed into a public forum for reformist organizations and members of Islamic religions. They were able to articulate their thoughts and define Islam globally thanks to this publication. Additionally, they form a committee to open elementary and high schools catering to both boys and girls in a way that makes them stand out from other private schools in terms of special education offerings (ibid, May 20, 1946).

The primary curricula in these schools covered the fundamentals of the Quran, familiarized students with the glorious history of Islam, and inspired them to bring this school and ideology back to life. These curricula also included some successes for the students, such as the establishment of non-profit schools for the illiterate and those who undoubtedly sought religious instruction; as a result, these classes and lectures permeated the Egyptian community's layers of life and induced their paradigms in them. Regarding the amount of supporters and members of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, there are a lot of divergent views. In a 2007 announcement, Yousef Neda, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement's official for foreign affairs, stated that the organization's membership count had surpassed one million, with members found in both Islamic and non-Islamic nations. The political advisor to the Supreme Guide, Abdul Hamid Ghazali, stated that there are 10 million members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 5 million followers. In addition, Dr. Abdul Sattar Al-



Maliji, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, claims that although the total number of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters may not surpass 100,000, their population appears to be higher given the organization's eight decades of existence and the fact that its members are spread across numerous nations.

Strategic Principles of Muslim Brotherhood Charter

1. Invitation to Pure Islam and righteous predecessor (Salafi Saleh) and return to original Islam;
2. To practice Holy Prophet's Tradition (Sunna) in all ideological and praying activities;
3. Self-enhancement through soul refinement, preservation of activities, friendship and fraternity (brotherhood) in the way of God;
4. Establishment of political organization to reform governance, training of people based on human self-esteem and dignity, and revision in relationship among Islamic Umma (community) with other nations;
5. Emphasis in acquisition of knowledge and science and technology as a religious duty;
6. Renovation of community and treatment of social diseases;
7. To do economic activities and acquisition of wealth;
8. Emphasis in physical education and body improvement. The main motto of Muslim Brotherhood is: God is our ultimate goal, the prophet is our leader, Quran is our Constitution, Jihad in way of God is our conduct, and martyrdom in way of God is our highest ideal.

Muslim Brotherhood Political Doctrine

1. The principles of political doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood can be summarized as follows: - Guidance, promotion, and construction of society to establish Islamic government; - Step-by-step policy and taking peaceful methods in political activities and in relation to the governing systems; - Factionalism and exploitation

from organization to achieve political objectives; -

2. Pluralism and belief in democracy inside and outside Muslim Brotherhood organization;
3. Emphasis on concept of Islamic Umma versus nation;
4. Interaction with Muslim denominations and avoidance from sectarian disputes and conflicts;
5. Opposition against Israel as an illegal newborn from the west in Islamic lands; Interaction with non- Muslim sects, particularly Coptic members inside Egypt;
6. Women's participation in all political and social activities except presidency position in the country;
7. Positive interaction with aliens and western world except colonial powers; - Supporting from Palestinian resistance.

Organizational Structure and Leadership of Muslim Brotherhood

The Supreme Guidance Office, Advisory Council, and Supreme Guide are the three fundamental pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood. Within the Muslim Brotherhood, the Founders' Board, also known as the Advisory Council, is the legislative and policymaking body. Its decisions are binding on all members and is tasked with providing ultimate oversight over population operations and electing a supreme leader. The thirty members of the advisory council are chosen from advisory councils around Egypt, and this council also has the option to add five specialists as members. The term of office for council members is four years. This council appointed the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, who will serve as a member of the advisory council for the remainder of his life and after his mission is completed, unless he is removed for failing to complete his duties. The Supreme Guide International Office oversees all executive activities for the Muslim Brotherhood and is in charge of the organization's supreme executive job. The advisory council from



different regions appoints the 13 members of the guidance office.

Muslim Brotherhood and Politics

It is necessary to discuss the Muslim Brotherhood's political strategy and how they come to understand that the religious government unquestionably sits at the top of the list. They have addressed this matter so thoroughly in their books and articles that there is no room for debate. Al-Banna describes the goals and strategies of this movement in one of his lectures in the following ways: "The Islam that the Muslim Brotherhood represents and adheres to is a religion in which the government is recognized as one of its fundamental pillars because the guidance also depends on the fulfilment of Islamic precepts. The government was regarded by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as one of the political pillars of Islam. Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) books discuss governmental organizations as part of their ideological principles and our behavior, not as a result of them. This is only a topic for Islamic discourse and polemic discussion because Islam is a system of law and order, and legislation, judicial rules, and training all coexist and are inseparable. These powers, which are not bound by divine order, may undermine the religious reformist's governance by enforcing their own special injunctions. In this instance, the natural consequence of this trend is similar to his crying in the wasteland. If the religious reformist is only guaranteed that he is a jurist, he determines the limits and is decision maker, and as an interpreter of Islamic injunction he conveys these principles" (ibid, pp 41–399).

This statement suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood held the view that Islamic laws and regulations should be the primary source of inspiration for legislation, and that Islamic signs and symbols should be used by all governmental entities if Islam is the recognized religion. The Egyptian Constitution, which is clearly a civil code based on western constitutions, is clearly

derived from Islamic Shari; in contrast, the only laws governing Muslim private conditions are taken from Islamic Shari, while other denominations have their own private conditions. Thus, the Egyptian civil code, the legal government in charge of Egypt, and the laws that their government has enforced irrespective of religious beliefs in contrast to their actions—civil law—may help the Muslim Brotherhood understand this issue in three different ways. Regarding the first case, the Muslim Brotherhood acknowledged that the Egyptian constitution does not fundamentally and significantly violate the law because it is more in line with Islamic principles than the current government. Regarding the Egyptian Civil Code, they held the following two opinions: (1) that the constitution contains a great deal of unclear and questionable language that might be interpreted and defined in a way that contradicts its own meaning. As a result, they requested that these guidelines be revised and interpreted in a clear and precise manner. They made it clear that they were protesting and opposing the third civil law case, and they asked that any changes be made to the laws pertaining to civil, criminal, commercial, and/or foreign matters that are proportionate to Islam. The liberation of the entire Nile Valley from foreign influence was their next significant political move, which led them to adopt a hostile stance toward the UK and never stopped ignoring the problem. They worked hard to support Ali Maher Pasha, who wanted to prevent war damage from falling on Egypt at the start of World War II. Ahmad Maher Pasha was fighting Germany and Italy at the time, but the Muslim Brotherhood did not back him and did not accompany him to battle. However, they continued to resist the UK government even though the Egyptian government was always cooperating with them. As a result, they were suppressed and many of their members were detained and imprisoned by the government. The resistance to the



administration was so strong that they were charged of plotting Ahmad Maher Pasha's murder.

Developing the Activities and Influence of Muslim Brotherhood in Political Scene in Egypt

The Second World War and its aftermath in Egypt helped to propagate the progressive trend of Muslim Brotherhood influence there. The Brotherhood's institutions grew more structured, and their political and ideological positions became more cohesive. Following the war, the group took advantage of the unrest inside the Vafd Party to present itself as a revolutionary group that opposed the status quo and swiftly won over the party's sizable support base. In 1948, the government announced the dissolution of the organization due to various conspiracies and pertinacious actions carried out by some members against the government. There were thirteen cases of accusations against the organization regarding terrorist activities, a plot to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy, the gathering of ammunition, etc., and in February 1949, Hassan Al-Banna was assassinated in an orchestrated plot (Sediqi, 1996).

Egyptian Revolution and Taking Power by Muhammad Mursi

Beginning on January 25, 2011, the Egyptian revolution resulted in Hosni Mubarak's resignation in February 2011 and the establishment of a military government (curfew) (Kareem Fahim and Mona El-Naggar, 2011). The opposition group declared their intention to protest by drawing inspiration from the successes of the Tunisian revolution, which included the revolution against torture, poverty, corruption, and unemployment; the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and the cancellation of urgent conditions (force majeure); the increase in the minimum wage; the cessation of hostilities; and, above all, their final call for the establishment of a popular and democratic government. Actually, on January 15,

2011, Egyptian people' protests against the Tunisian Embassy in support of the Tunisian revolution ignited the first flame of Islamic vigilance. A young Egyptian named Abduh Abdul Monem Hemadeh Jafar Calipheh burned himself alive two days after this demonstration to protest the shutdown of his restaurant and the officials' disregard for his pleas. He was against the construction of a public parliament in this country. He yelled some catchphrases, such as "Oh nation's security forces! Before he burned himself alive in defiance of the parliament, my rights were taken away in Egypt. Finally, following several days of clashes, street demonstrations, and strikes, Hosni Mubarak and his spouse departed Egypt from Al-Maza airport for an undisclosed location. On February 11, 2011, according to a report from the BBC News Agency, Mubarak departed Egypt for an undisclosed destination. This day was seen by many analysts as the Egyptian Revolution's victory day.

Following Hosni Mubarak's resignation and subsequent flight, the army was tasked with overseeing Egyptian affairs. In a comprehensive declaration, the army declared that, in the eyes of the Egyptian people, this council was not a legitimate replacement for the government. It should be mentioned that Mohammad Hussein Tantavi, the Egyptian minister of defense, was given charge of this council. While these developments were taking place in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood Society was able to create the Freedom and Justice Party as a political faction for this society following the revolution on January 25. This allowed the party to win the majority of votes in elections for the country's representatives in the parliament, but it was later dissolved by a court of constitution. In addition, the Freedom and Justice Party was able to secure the majority of votes in the second round of Egyptian parliamentary elections, which were for the consultative parliament. This means that the culmination of all these political victories was Mohamed



Morsi's victory as the Muslim Brotherhood society's nominee for president. On June 17, 2012, Egypt held presidential elections. Mohamed Morsi defeated General Ahmad Shafiq by obtaining 51.73% of the total votes cast. It is important to note that only 50% of eligible voters cast ballots in this election, which may indicate that support for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was shaky (Cinar and Gocer, 2014).

Empirical Review

While so far only few articles have been written about the resistance and social movement of the Muslim Brotherhood after the coup of el-Sisi, there are nevertheless some that deserve mentioning. According to Cesari (2014), the Muslim Brotherhood should be seen as a social movement. He explains that the Muslim Brotherhood has built social networks, associations and educational, cultural, and welfare programs across Egypt (Cesari, 2014). In addition to this view, Amr Darrag (2016) states that the Muslim Brotherhood is fundamentally an Islamic social movement and not just a political one. The author states that the organization teaches its members to “view the value of service, first and foremost, through a religious lens” (Darrag, 2016). Furthermore, a number of Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood are interested in maintaining structures like the nation-state. El-Shemy (2015), states that the relationship between the leaders and the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were seriously tested after the military coup of el-Sisi in July 2013 (p.92). The author writes that the leadership of the organization reacted defiantly, to preserve the movement’s cohesion, even though it was at the expense of their earlier political gains; this counter-acted the goal of the el-Sisi regime to divide the Muslim Brotherhood (El-Shemy, 2015). The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood knew that the military coup was a breaking point: they could either accept that the military had taken over, or they could “fight” against

the coup. They chose to fight, because they did not want to lose their credibility.

According to El-Shemy (2015), they immediately adopted a discourse, emphasizing that this was a fight over the identity of Egypt, during their resistance against the coupe (p.93). They spoke about democracy, human rights, and legitimacy, in order to gain sympathetic attention not only from Egyptians, but also from the international audience. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood agreed that they could not allow the military to rule again (El-Shemy, 2015). According to El-Shemy (2015), the Muslim Brotherhood urged its members to demonstrate against the military coup, even though it could bring risks to those demonstrating; the survival of the movement was at stake. Their strategy, in order to show active resistance against the coup, was to organize pro-Morsi demonstrations across the whole country and to hold sit-ins, for example, on Rabaa Square, to show that the military coup of July 2013 was not a revolution and that they were not giving up (El-Shemy, 2015).

Since el-Sisi started a repressive campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, operating inside Egypt became difficult if not impossible. Therefore, according to El-Shemy (2015), they turned to their leaders who had fled Egypt, such as Mahmoud Ezzat and members based in Qatar, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. As El-Shemy (2015) writes in his article, it is unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood will reconcile with the regime of el-Sisi, because this would mean that the sacrifices many members had made were useless in the end. He states that it is likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to destabilize el-Sisi’s regime with protests and acts of economic sabotage. In addition to this, he states that the Muslim Brotherhood is hoping for another coup, but that it is too soon to tell whether or not this will happen (El-Shemy, 2015).

These articles are a helpful tool in understanding how the Muslim Brotherhood survived after the military



coup in July 2013. The study of El-Shemy has shown that the Muslim Brotherhood did not accept this military coup led by el-Sisi; the organization made the decision to fight against, and resist, the el-Sisi regime. El-Shemy (2015) also argues that, since the Muslim Brotherhood could not operate anymore from inside Egypt, the organization turned to members who had fled abroad. However, the author did not investigate the importance of these fled members, and to what extent they played a role in the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood. These are all important and interesting aspects that need more in-depth research.

Both Darrag (2016) and Cesari (2014) stated that the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as a social movement; however, neither author took the current repressive campaign of el-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood into account. It can be argued that it is important that this should be taken into consideration, because the repressive measures taken might have changed the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, an important question that needs to be asked is whether the Muslim Brotherhood is still providing the same social services as it did before the military coup. If the Muslim Brotherhood no longer provides these social services, thus breaking its social networks, what consequences will this have for an organization that is seen as a social movement and would the Muslim Brotherhood still match the description of a standard social movement.

Theoretical Framework

Resource Mobilization Theory was adopted for this study. This approach is part of the social movement theory and is developed in response to the shortcomings of some earlier approaches to social movements. The resource mobilization theory (RMT), views movements as rational, organized manifestations of collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2004). According to Flynn (n.d), resource

mobilization theory has five main principles: “1) the actions of social movements are rational; 2) actions are influenced by institutionalized power imbalances and conflicts of interests; 3) the power imbalances and conflicts of interests are enough to create grievances that lead to the mobilization of a social movement’s intent on changing the supply of resources and organization; 4) centralized and formal social movements are more effective in mobilizing resources and achieving goals of change than informal and decentralized social movements; 5) the success of a social movement is mainly influenced by its group strategy and the political climate” (Flynn, n.d.).

Most research on Islamic activism does not directly utilize RMT. However, the mosque, for example, is a central institution for religious teachings in Muslim communities and is often used by Islamic groups as a social capital due to the respect it enjoys with a broad section of the population. Activists and militants use mosques to offer sermons, teach lessons and organize study groups to propagate the movement message, organize for collective action and recruit new members. Mosques also provide a national network that connects communities of activists worldwide (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Therefore, mosques are a resource for social mobilization. Another example of available resources are Islamic non- governmental organizations, such as schools, charity societies, medical clinics and hospitals, which provide basic goods and services in an effort to show that the Islam is the solution to problems people are facing in Muslim societies. However, they do not only provide social services, but they also use social interactions with local communities to propagate and recruit new members as well (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

These organizations present a friendly public space that allows the promotion of Islamic messages, without directly confronting the regime that pays at least lip



service to Islam. Islamic non-governmental facilities can provide tangible resources for mobilization; especially if the regime tries to narrow formal political space. Islamic activists also mobilize through the structure of professional and student associations. These associations function as alternate political areas where different social movements compete for control of institutional positions and resources (Wiktorowicz, 2004). The resource mobilization theory also illuminates the role of informal institutions and social networks. Wiktorowicz (2004), states that several studies have shown the importance of social networks for movement recruitment. "This is specifically true for high-risk activism where social ties provide bonds of trust and solidarity and encourage activism" (Wiktorowicz, 2004). In a context where there is repression, informal institutions and social networks are a good option for resource mobilization, since these are rooted in everyday life and are therefore more resistant to state control. "Through a loose web of personal relationships, informal meetings and study circles, social networks can provide viable resources for movement survival and activism" (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

3. Methodology

Research Design

This study used cross-sectional descriptive survey design. The study was mainly descriptive in nature, because of its heavy reliance on description, interpretation of the various views and ideas of the respondents. It was cross-sectional since the data was collected from the informers once at a time. This was considered appropriate because it engenders careful description and explanation of factual and detailed information about the opinion of the respondents on *The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhoods in Power: Context, Dimensions and Emerging Trajectories*.

3.2 Method of Data Collection

Primary data for the study was also generated from formal interviewing of respondents to supplement the secondary data. The researcher conducted interview with diplomats, and university lecturers in Abuja and Katsina state through systematic sampling at every three-three intervals. They were chosen on the basis of the researcher's knowledge and judgment that their wealth of experience will help make this research work formidable, unique and stand the taste of time, hence my request for their expertise view and contribution towards the success of this research is apt. Focus group discussion was also used to gathered data. The participants who participated in focus group discussions were drawn from religious leaders and diplomats. This was apt for they find it convenient while discussing among their peers. This method of data collection, in reality, helped to analyze Muslim Brotherhood Movement and find out how the organization survived after the military coup in July 2013 following repressive campaign it is facing to this day. Since the Muslim Brotherhood has an international network, it is important to research several sections abroad to find out if these sections played any role in its survival. Secondary sources relating to the topic and its relevant material are derived from the reports of both governmental and non-governmental organizations on the Muslim Brotherhood. These non-governmental organizations include Amnesty International and Human Right.

Validity and Reliability of Instruments

The researchers ensured the validity of the instruments by making sure that the contents of the instruments are consistent with both the objectives and assumption of the study. Also, efforts were made to ensure that all aspects considered relevant to the study are adequate covered. Therefore, in order to ensure this research possesses high validity, external criterion method was adopted and was achieved by checking how



correct the findings of a particular instrument is by comparing the results with existing knowledge as well as the findings of the research gotten from interview. These methods described above were carefully employed so as to ensure that the study is highly reliable and valid. Finally, in order to ensure that the instruments are reliable and pave way for accurate testing of assumption of study which will in turn enable a dependable and objective deduction, inferences and conclusions, internal consistency method was effectively adopted. This was achieved by crosschecking information alongside other sources of data collection and by ensuring that the facts and figures collected from other sources mentioned earlier are accurate and would remain the same if the collection is repeated over time. To also ensure that the instruments have high reliability, the interview was structurally constructed in a simple, concise and unambiguous manner so as to allow easy understanding of the questions by the respondents and so as to ensure consistency in their answers.

4. Results and Discussion

Data Presentation and Analysis

This section will aim to analyze the four sub-questions of this research, in order to get a final answer on the two central research questions of this thesis. The data will be analyzed through the four sub-questions and will be applied to the theoretical concepts that are mentioned in chapter 2. Firstly, the repressive policy of el-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood will be introduced, in order to give a clear image of what kind of measures the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is facing. Secondly, the reaction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the repression by el-Sisi will be given, to analyze how they reacted to this state repression. Thirdly, the reactions of the Muslim Brotherhood sections in other countries to the repression and overthrow will be discussed, because these foreign sections are an important factor for the

survival of the organization. At last, the reaction of the states that are/were friendly to the Muslim Brotherhood after the repression will be discussed. The countries that will be discussed are Qatar, Turkey, United States and the United Kingdom, because these countries are also an important factor in order to understand how the Muslim Brotherhood survived.

Sisi's Repressive Policy against the Muslim Brotherhood

El-Sisi and the Egyptian army led a military coup that ousted Mohamed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egypt and the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, on July 3, 2013. Ever since, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the target of a campaign of repression by the Egyptian government. This sub-chapter's goal is to examine and respond to the following sub-question:

In order to provide a comprehensive summary of the many actions that el-Sisi conducted against the Muslim Brotherhood, this sub-chapter will be organized into sections. First, the conflicts between the el-Sisi dictatorship and pro-Morsi demonstrators will be examined. Second, we'll talk about the punishments imposed on Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters. Third, there will be a reference of the Muslim Brotherhood ceasing to operate in various capacities. Finally, because a number of non-governmental groups have expressed disapproval of the repression implemented against the Muslim Brotherhood, a brief discussion will be held regarding the criticism leveled against el-Sisi's repressive policies.

Clashes between Pro-Morsi Protesters and the Regime of el-Sisi

Pro-Morsi demonstrators staged massive sit-ins at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square and al-Nahda Square following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi. There were frequent clashes between the security forces and the pro-Morsi demonstrators because they refused to talk or leave. It was estimated on July 26, 2013, that the violent



battles between security forces and the Muslim Brotherhood had resulted in about 250 deaths and 2,800 injuries (Nine Bedford Row International, 2015, p.81). The deadliest altercation occurred on August 14, when security personnel violently dismantled the pro-Morsi sit-in in Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya square. At least 817 protestors were slain on this particular day, making it possibly the largest mass massacre of protestors in contemporary Egyptian history, according to Mephram (2015). He added that although the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed during the Mubarak administration, the campaign of repression has evolved into one that was widespread and uncontrolled (Mephram, 2015). It's vital to remember that while many people condemned these altercations, some contend that the Muslim Brotherhood deliberately provoked them. In a publication by the international criminal law expert Nine Bedford Row International, what particular actions did the el-Sisi administration take against the Muslim Brotherhood? a 2015 study about the Muslim Brotherhood. According to this, the activists used both violence and civil disobedience to accomplish two objectives that were essential to their larger scheme of taking back control of Egypt. These two objectives were: The Muslim Brotherhood intended to use violence for two reasons: 1) to increase their status as martyrs and garner sympathy and support from around the world by inciting violent confrontations with the security forces; and 2) to cause chaos in the event that they were to regain power due to the disruption of Egypt's social and economic order caused by these violent clashes (Nine Bedford Row International, 2015, p. 116).

Termination of Activities of the Muslim Brotherhood

Following the July 2013 military takeover, the newly installed military government has implemented a number of policies aimed at dismantling and disbanding the Muslim Brotherhood. This section will cover a

number of actions that were done against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed by the government shortly after President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown. The Muslim Brotherhood's assets were also ordered to be frozen by the court, and other groups affiliated with the organization were prohibited (Kingsley, 2013).

The government seized a large portion of the organization's financial holdings because it thought this would effectively stop its operations. Additionally, the new administration shut down dozens of companies that Muslim Brotherhood activists owned or operated. A drive to regulate the religious activities of the Muslim Brotherhood has also been started by the regime. The Ministry of Religious Endowments, an organization that oversees religious matters, and Al-Azhar, the country's preeminent institution, have significantly reduced Egypt's public religious space. They accomplished this by designating preachers and controlling who mosques could donate to. Additionally, hundreds of preachers and imams have been fired by the dictatorship, which has also rigorously standardized the subjects of the Friday prayers. The dictatorship cited the preachers' and imams' lack of the necessary license as the explanation. The boards of directors that the ministry had appointed for the mosques under Mohamed Morsi were suspended by the new leadership of the ministry (El-Sherif, 2014).

1,055 non-governmental organizations had their bank accounts frozen by the Central Bank of Egypt due to allegations that they had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The administration of 147 Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated schools was also the target of enforcement actions by Egypt's Ministry of Education. The ministry selected new directors, reconstituted the boards of directors, and placed the institutions under its administrative and financial control (Brotherhood schools to be taken by Egypt's Education Ministry). In addition, the



government closed down a number of television networks. These TV stations include Al Hafez, Al Nas, and Misr 25, which is owned by the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, because Mubasher Misr, an Al Jazeera channel, included coverage of pro-Morsi protests, it was shut down ("Two months after Morsi's ousting, thousands protest across Egypt", 2013). Following a crackdown on other media outlets deemed to be sympathetic to the deposed president Mohamed Morsi, these television networks were closed. The government designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group in December 2013. This was only one more phase in the continuing persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior spokesman announced that anyone found to be a verified member of the Muslim Brotherhood, anyone discovered possessing publications or recordings of the group, and anyone who publicly or privately supported the group would all be prosecuted. A severe punishment would also be meted out to anyone who provided funding to the Muslim Brotherhood ("Egypt's interior ministry details sentences for associating with 'terrorist' Brotherhood", 2013). One day later, the daily newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party was prohibited from publication by the government. Furthermore, the Egyptian government enforced anti-terrorism legislation to combat violent insurgencies. These regulations allowed the regime to enforce curfews and expel individuals; among other things, they carried the death penalty for anyone found guilty of organizing or heading a terrorist group (Pestano, 2015). A seven-year prison sentence might be imposed on those found guilty of inciting violence or building websites to disseminate terrorist propaganda. Anyone proven to be providing financial support to terrorist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, faces a 25-year prison

sentence. Military and law enforcement professionals who use force are exempt from prosecution in stark contrast to these sentences (Pestano, 2015).

President el-Sisi declared on October 22, 2014, that Egypt was determined to combat terrorism using a comprehensive approach. Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, El-Sisi connected the group's downfall from power to the Egyptians' uprising against them. El-Sisi claimed that the decision to choose conflict came from the Muslim Brotherhood. After several months, on January 20, 2015, the government attempted to initiate talks with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The Muslim Brotherhood's leaders and the Egyptian government met multiple times. The administration's goal to persuade the Muslim Brotherhood to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Egyptian government was the principal topic of discussion during the discussions. In exchange, the government pledged to free some of the Muslim Brotherhood's detained members and reintegrate them into politics. As a result, in 2015, the government did not detain any of the organization's moderate leaders. Yasser Ali, Amr Daraj, and Muhammad Ali Bashr are some of these leaders. But in an effort to promote peace, the dictatorship started to apply penalties on the moderate leaders after realizing that the Muslim Brotherhood was unwilling to make concessions. As stated in "Talks Break Down as Muslim Brotherhood Refuses to Reconcile with Egyptian Government", (2015), the Muslim Brotherhood ultimately declined to make amends with the government. In early January 2016, around thirty-six Facebook page administrators were taken into custody on allegations of inciting opposition to governmental institutions, disseminating the beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhood, and instigating demonstrations on January 25 (Hilleary, 2016).



Reaction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Sisi's Repressive Policy

Since the current regime of Egypt has implemented a repressive strategy against the Muslim Brotherhood to break its power, the Muslim Brotherhood reacted to this in several ways. As a result of the events that happened since Mohamed Morsi's overthrow, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a series of organizational and ideological changes. They needed to develop a more tight-knit organization. "You don't just sign up for the Brotherhood, it's a serious process," says Shadi Hamid, a Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution (Di Giovanni, Elisson, 2015). In this sub-chapter the following sub-question will be analyzed and answered:

To give a clear overview, this sub-chapter will be divided into several sections that each explain a different aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood's reaction towards Sisi's repressive policies. These aspects include an overview of the organizational and ideological changes that the Muslim Brotherhood has made in reaction to the repression, the Muslim Brotherhood underground, and at last the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, since many of its members fled abroad following the repression.

Organizational Changes

The Muslim Brotherhood as an organization is characterized by a centralized and inflexible hierarchy. However, since the military coup in July 2013, the organization has become more decentralized in order to give the cells that were operating in the field more freedom of action (Striem, 2015). Brown & Dunne (2015) state that the Muslim Brotherhood has already become less hierarchical, less focused on its own organizational sustainability, and less persistent on distinguishing itself from other Islamist groups. Most high-level leaders and activists, in the first to third tiers of the group's leadership, were arrested.

This included members of the Guidance Bureau, the group's top decision-making authority, the Shura Council, the parliament of the Brotherhood, and also the heads of governmental administrative bureaus. As a result of these arrests, direct hierarchical links in the organization were broken. This led to a shift in policy-making to lower tiers of leadership on local levels. As follows, running a micro-organization has become the survival tactic of choice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hierarchical structures have been replaced by cluster-type.

Ideological Changes

Since the military coup in July 2013, a shift had occurred in the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse on violence. As noted earlier, many leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested as part of the repression strategy against the organization. This repression has led the Muslim Brotherhood to an ideological crisis (Ranko & Nezda, 2016). Due to the restructuring process, the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood had gained an increase of power. Many of these youngsters have no faith in the former strategy of peaceful political participation. According to Trager and Shalabi (2015), most of the youth has the intention to escalate the conflict with the current regime and consider the use of violence legitimate.

Muslim Brotherhood Underground

When the Muslim Brotherhood was designated as a terrorist organization in December 2013, it was to be expected that it would continue as an underground movement as it did in the 1950s and 1980s. In the past, the Muslim Brotherhood has developed the following parts: 1) propaganda, 2) organization, and 3) political legitimacy. They started on a community level and offered support on an individual basis, they used group resources to give financial aid and they financed its programs by collecting donations from members (Mcfall, 2014). Since the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood still applies the same method, but on a much



larger scale than in the past. This could help to regain popular support in Egypt, while pushing their agenda of integrating Islam into everyday life. This would lead, according to Mcfall (2014), to the second stage of political advancement, which is reorganization. However, because the Muslim Brotherhood is officially seen as a terrorist organization, the reorganization must be conducted underground. At last, the Muslim Brotherhood will enter the final stage, which is taking political action and claiming legitimacy (Mcfall, 2014).

Muslim Brotherhood Continues as an Underground Movement

As already mentioned before, the Muslim Brotherhood was designated a terrorist organization in December 2013 and due to this, the organization is excluded from political, social, and religious activities. Therefore, it can be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood continues its activities in the underground as it has done in the past. For example, in 1954, when the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of an attempted assassination on Nasser, the Egyptian regime suppressed and outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (Friedland, 2015). These repressive measures included the arrests of many Muslim Brotherhood members, they were thrown into jail, tortured and some of its members even got killed (Holtmann, 2013). In reaction to these repressive measures, the Muslim Brotherhood had gone underground. Nasser's repressive actions are quite similar to the actions the regime of el-Sisi took after the military coup in 2013 and since there is no reconciliation in sight between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, going and staying underground is a logical consequence. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood also shows that it was able to survive several waves of repression after it went underground. This will probably also be the case for the future.

Muslim Brotherhood Divided - Youth vs. Old Guard

In the past the Muslim Brotherhood organization has been linked to political violence and to violent Jihad (Ardovini, 2015). In the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood created the 'Secret Apparatus', this paramilitary branch wanted to pursue its objectives by using violence (Zalman, n.d). The Secret Apparatus was mainly active between 1947 and 1949. Eventually in 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned because of the escalation of violent acts which this secret paramilitary branch committed (Ardovini, 2016). However, not every member of the Muslim Brotherhood agreed with this paramilitary branch and this led to a division within the organization. In the 1950s and 1960s, in response to the repression, Sayyid Qutb, a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated that "the tortures and their regime were legitimate targets of Jihad" (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The main aim of this study was to explain how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt survived, in light of the social movement theory, after the military coup in July. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood shows that, despite its religious label, it can be seen as a social-political movement. Furthermore, this study explains the extent network abroad played a role in the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The government and non-governmental organizations should support youth economic empowerment, education, and interfaith and multiethnic communication. Political actors should stop utilizing religion and ethnicity as a means of dividing and controlling the general populace. Instead, there should be an ideology-based politics free from political resentment and hatred.



The government must take the initiative to encourage religious adherents to cultivate a culture of tolerance in order to successfully reduce the ongoing incidence of religious violence in Egypt. Credible religious scholars should educate adherents of both religions so that they develop the habit of reporting through the appropriate channels if they are offended by an individual or group practicing the other religion, rather than enacting laws on their own without following the law.

Government must demonstrate responsibility, openness, responsiveness, equity, and justice at all levels, from the federal to the local.

The public must first be made aware of the value of education and the necessity of returning to school to obtain the bare minimum of the knowledge required to contribute to society if the government is to eliminate or drastically lower the rate of unemployment in the nation. In addition, the government must supplement this by offering job opportunities to individuals who meet the necessary qualifications. For now, these are insufficient.

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